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ABSTRACT 
The Department of Defense funds advanced education 
through the Voluntary Education Program.  This study 
explores the following questions: (1) What is the economic 
return on the Navy’s Voluntary Education Program (VOLED), 
especially Tuition Assistance (TA)?  (2) What is the impact 
of TA on a sailor’s career? and (3) What does a review of 
the literature indicate about the effects of the VOLED 
program? 
Some of the potential benefits of VOLED on sailors 
include improving their ability to cross-rate, improving 
their chances of advancement in their current rating, 
lowering their demotion rates and, possibly, improving 
reenlistment.  Higher retention benefits the Navy by 
reducing the replacement costs for new recruits.  While 
there is debate about the impact of VOLED on retention, the 
VOLED program is a service that is actively sought out by 
sailors, which suggests that it improves sailor satisfaction 
with the Navy  
The study concludes that additional funding should be 
given to the VOLED program based on the potential benefits 
to the Navy and the likely increase of usage in the future.  
A study should be commissioned in the Navy to statistically 
assess the quantifiable effects of the Navy’s VOLED program. 
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The United States military has been struggling with the 
issue of educating its members since the conception of the 
Army and Navy.  Spending on education versus other 
operational inputs is a difficult trade off and one that is 
not close to being balanced.  However, as technology 
advances, the need for educated service members increases.  
In the Navy the question of education for enlisted service 
members and the funding for that education is an important 
current policy issue.  Recently, for example, the Navy 
mandated that all Chief Petty Officers must have an 
Associate Degree or higher in order to advance to Senior 
Chief Petty Officer by year 2011.1  Advanced education will 
not disappear from the deck plates and funding that advanced 
education will continue to be a difficult policy issue. 
In modern times, the federal government has 
consistently funded some sort of education for service 
members.  The Rehabilitation Act of 1919 provided 
educational assistance to veterans who were disabled in 
World War I.  At the end of World War II, the United States 
enacted the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, called 
the G. I. Bill of Rights.  This program was followed by the 
Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEEP) program, 
which offered continuing education benefits to Vietnam 
veterans.  Currently, the Montgomery G. I. Bill (MGIB), 
                     
1 Navy Personnel Command, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Reference 
Library, Messages,NAVADMIN 203/05 DTG 191320Z AUG 05. 
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which was instituted in 1985, provides up to 36 months of 
educational assistance that can be used by both active duty 
service members and veterans.2 The above programs are by 
enlarge utilized by service members after they leave active 
duty.  
The Department of Defense funds the attainment of 
advanced education and the Navy captures those funds through 
the Voluntary Education Program (VOLED).  VOLED is a program 
for service members on active duty who want to gain an 
advanced education.  This program has been under scrutiny 
for the last few years.  The armed forces has tried to 
estimate the return on investment (ROI) to determine the 
economic returns to the service for the money that is spent 
on education programs each year.  Several analyses have been 
conducted, including an analysis of the ROI, but the results 
have not been consistent.   
B. BACKGROUND 
Code 2007 Title 10, U. S. code is the authorization for 
payment of tuition for off duty training or education.  
Funds are distributed from the U.S. government to the 
individual service chiefs in order to fund the continuing 
education programs.  VOLED is based on Department of Defense 
(DOD) Instructions that has been issued to implement Code 
2007.  Department of Defense Instruction (DODINST) 1322.25 
dated February 5, 1997 states that “Members of the Armed 
Forces serving on active duty shall be afforded the 
                     
2 Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003, p. 1. 
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opportunity to complete their high school education, earn an 
equivalency diploma, improve their academic skills or level 
of literacy, enroll in vocational and technical schools, 
receive college credit for military training and experience 
in accordance with the American Council on Education’s guide 
to the evaluation of nontraditional learning experiences in 
the armed forces, take tests to earn college credit and, and 
enroll in post-secondary education programs that lead to 
associates, bachelor’s and graduate degrees.  Service 
Members costs to participate in Voluntary Education Programs 
shall be reduced through financial support, including 
tuition assistance that is administered uniformly across the 
Services.”3 
From that guidance, the Department of the Navy issued 
the Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 1560.4 
series which established the Navy’s VOLED Program.  The 
current version of this series is SECNAVINST 1560.4A dated 
December 1, 2005.  This instruction directs the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps (CMC) to carry out the DOD continuing education 
program.  The Secretary of the Navy directs the CNO and CMC 
to “Ensure that sufficient fiscal, facilities, and staffing 
support is provided to carry out requirements of this 
instruction, including, but not limited to, a worldwide 
network of education centers, trained staff to provide 
educational counseling, adequate facilities, and funding for 
tuition assistance and academic skills programs.”4  The CNO 
                     
3 Department of Defense Instruction 1322.25 dated February 5, 1997, 
p. 2. 
4 Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1560.4A dated December 1, 2005, 
p. 3. 
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has delegated administration of the VOLED program to the 
Naval Education and Training Command (NETC), and provided 
specific guidance to the Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP). 
Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 1560.9 dated April 4, 1988 
outlines the CNO direction and explains how the Navy will 
implement the DOD policy.  The essential components of the 
Navy’s VOLED program are Tuition Assistance (TA), Program 
for Afloat College Education (PACE), Academic Skills and 
Navy Campus.  Additionally the instruction outlines 
responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Education and 
Training and the Deputy CNO with regard to continuing 
education.5 
C. VOLUNTARY EDUCATION 
The first component of the VOLED program is the TA 
Program, which enables sailors to reduce the expenses of 
receiving off duty education at accredited colleges, 
universities and other schools.6  TA is the largest part of 
the VOLED program accounting for 71 percent of VOLED 
funding.7 Currently the TA program pays 100 percent of 
tuition costs for a High School diploma or for an 
equivalency certificate (GED).  For courses at other 
educational levels, there is a fiscal year cap of 16 
semester hours, 24 quarter hours, 240 clock hours or 24 
continuing education units.  Tuition and fees will be funded 
                     
5 Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 1560.9 dtd April 4, 1988, p. 
2. 
6 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary Education 
Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40:8, April 1998. 
7 This figure was provided by CTR CPD in Pensacola, FL, March 2007. 
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by the Navy $250.00 per semester hour, $166.67 per quarter 
hour, $16.67 per clock hour, $166.67 per continuing 
education unit.  Funding is provided in advance, unless the 
add-drop period has passed.  In these cases, service members 
are not reimbursed for costs incurred.8 
TA is available to all enlisted personnel and officers 
on active duty, and to enlisted Naval Reservists ordered to 
active duty for at least 120 days.  For Naval Reserve 
Officers, activation for two years or more is required.  The 
program also requires that the service member remain on 
active duty during the duration of the course, and that the 
final grades of the course be provided to the Navy.9 
If the course grade is a Withdraw (W) or Fail (F), then 
the service member must reimburse the Navy.  The program 
does not pay for books or other course materials such as CD 
roms.  Enlisted personnel do not incur an additional service 
commitment when using TA; however, Officers must remain on 
active duty for two years after the completion of the last 
course funded by the TA Program.10  This obligation can be 
served concurrently with other obligations such as the 
Surface Warfare Junior Officer bonus. 
The second component of the VOLED system is the Program 
for Afloat College Education (PACE).  This program is 
targeted at sailors on a sea duty rotation (to include 
squadrons) and in remote locations.  Sailors can attend 
courses tuition free, only incurring the price of books and 
                     
8 Naval War College, Tuition Assistance, 




course materials.  PACE offers college courses for credit, 
as well as remedial modules in English, Language Arts, 
Reading, Math and Basic Science.  To determine appropriate 
placement in the PACE system, the Armed Forces Vocational 
Aptitude Battery Test (ASVAB) score is used as well as 
previous college experience.11  Instruction delivery for the 
PACE program is either via an electronic method, such as a 
CD course, or via an instructor who is embarked onboard the 
Naval vessel. 
Academic Skills Learning Centers provide shore-based 
sailors with the same basic classes (with no college credit) 
for the remedial modules.  The mission of the Centers is to 
provide sailors with basic skills remediation, increasing 
their knowledge and preparing them for college classes.12 
The final VOLED component is Navy Campus.  This 
facility exists to give sailors individual counseling about 
their academic careers, and to provide a road map to earn a 
GEB diploma or a degree (Associate, Bachelor, or Graduate).  
Navy Campus also administers the ACT, SAT, CLEP, and DANTES 
exams to sailors.13 
The Navy has advanced to the internet and introduced 
the SMART transcript program.  This program outlines 
sailors’ career paths for their rating and converts those 
training experiences into potential college credit via a 
college who participates in the Service Members Opportunity  
 
                     
11 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40:11, April 1998.  
12 Ibid., p. 11. 
13 Ibid., p. 12. 
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College (SOC) Degree Program.  Both of these programs, SOC 
and Smart Transcript, are outside of the scope of this study 
but are worth noting. 
The VOLED Program as a whole must be reviewed 
periodically to ensure that the program is still 
accomplishing its mission as well as to “document the impact 
of VOLED programs on personnel and commands.”14  Also, 
funding for the program must be balanced against other Navy 
programs so the Navy can allocate its resources where they 
will yield the highest return.  Historically, the Tuition 
Assistance Program has drawn the most attention as it is the 
most widely used part of the VOLED program. 
Recently there have been four studies conducted to 
analyze ROI on the VOLED and/or TA programs:  (1) A Center 
of Naval Analysis (CNA) study Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program authored by Federico E. Garcia, Ernest H. 
Joy and David Reese published in 1998; (2) an article from 
Economics of Education Review entitled “Does Employer-
financed General Training Pay?  Evidence from the U. S. 
Navy”, authored by Federico Garcia, Jeremy Arkes and Robert 
Trost published in 2002, (3) a RAND Corporation study, 
Tuition Assistance Usage and First Term Military Retention; 
authored by Richard Buddin and Kanika Kapur in 2001, and (4) 
a study by the United States Army Research Institute for the 
Behavioral and Social Sciences, Impact of the Army 
Continuing Education System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and  
 
 
                     
14 Secretary of Navy Instruction 1540.4A dated December 1, 2005, p. 
4. 
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Performance: Data Analyses authored by Paul J. Sticha, 
Timothy A. Dall, Kristina Handy, Javier Espinosa, Paul F. 
Hogan, Mark C. Young published in 2003. 
D. THESIS QUESTIONS AND SCOPE 
To answer the research questions, prior studies will be 
reviewed and their results applied to the current situation 
to access what changes, if any, need to be made to current 
policy.  The primary research question of this thesis is: 
“What is the economic return on the Navy’s Voluntary 
Education Program (especially TA)?”  The analysis in this 
thesis concentrates on the TA program but also discusses the 
other programs which make up the entire VOLED program.  TA 
is the program that is the most controversial within all the 
studies, it is common to all services, and it accounts for 
the majority of funds spent on VOLED.   
The second research question is: “What is the impact of 
TA on a sailor’s career?”  This study will review the 
information and draw conclusions from the literature in 
order to discover the true impact on a sailor’s career.   
The Third question is “What does a review of the 
literature indicate about the effects of the VOLED program?”  
Are the effects of Voluntary Education far reaching and 
force shaping, or is this just another quality of life 
program? 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS  
Chapter II reviews the prior statistical studies of the 
Voluntary Education Programs.  Chapter III compares the 
study designs of the statistical studies.  Chapter IV 
 9
describes the Next Generation emerging in the Navy and the 
present status of their opportunity to gain advanced 
education from civilian universities.  Chapter V summarizes 
all reviewed work, emphasizing the commonalities.  Chapter 
VI presents conclusions drawn from the reviewed works. 
 10
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II. PRIOR STUDIES OF THE VOLUNTARY EDUCATION 
PROGRAM 
A. THE CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS VOLED STUDY 
CNA commissioned a study to evaluate the VOLED system.  
That study, Effectiveness of the Voluntary Education 
Program, was authored by Federico E. Garcia, Ernest H. Joy 
and David Reese and published in 1998.  The questions the 
study concentrated on were: What is the impact of 
participating in VOLED on the career and promotion 
probabilities of individual sailors? What is the impact on 
sailor retention? Is VOLED cost effective? Finally, what 
policies would enhance the VOLED system?15 
1. Data 
The CNA built an educational history file for active-
duty enlisted sailors covering the period August 1992 
through March 1997.  Garcia et al. noted that the Navy does 
not have a centralized database for student records, so they 
constructed their own database from the information provided 
from several commands.16 
Information TA was constructed from 510,000 records 
obtained from the Navy Campus Management Information System 
(NCMIS), maintained by NETPDTC.17  Central Texas College 
provided 63,000 records on participants in the Instructor 
PACE program.  Information was provided by Middlesex 
                     
15 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40:2-4, April 1998.   
16 Ibid., p. 15. 
17 Ibid. 
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Research Center on 22,000 participants in the Technology 
Pace program.18  No information was available on the 
Academic Skills Learning Centers.19  Finally, 20,200 records 
were obtained on sailors who had attended orientation briefs 
on the PACE program.20 
Navy School House course costs were collected for 
Fiscal Year (FY) 1996.21  These costs included the costs of 
A-school, C-school, bootcamp, and fleet training.  For the 
analysis phase of the study, a single cohort was utilized 
(FY 1992 cohort) to construct and estimate the multivariable 
regression models. 
2. Statistical Models 
To analyze promotion outcomes, an ordered probit model 
was specified and estimated.  A simple bivarate logit or 
probit model would have been inappropriate for this study 
because it would fail to account for the ordinal nature of 
the paygrade outcomes.22  That is, in a given cohort 
individuals would advance to different grades at a given 
point in time. 
The authors pointed out that motivation of VOLED 
participants may be different (higher) than that of non-
participants, which would cause selection bias.  This 
selection bias was controlled by isolating the promotion and 
retention effects directly attributable to VOLED by using 
                     
18 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40:15, April 1998.   
19 Ibid., p. 16. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., p. 17. 
22 Ibid., p. 53. 
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the Heckman two-step process.23  This involves estimating 
two equations, one to predict VOLED participation and one to 
predict retention (or promotion) outcomes.  To analyze 
retention and promotion, a binomial probit model was used.   
3. Findings 
The findings from the promotion model indicated that 
the effect of VOLED is positive; 31 percent of Sailors with 
no college education who participated in the VOLED program 
achieved the rank of E5 within five years or less.24  If 15 
college credits were obtained through VOLED then the chances 
of achieving E5 in five years or less rose from 31 percent 
to 43 percent, a gain of 12 points. If 30 credits were 
obtained, the probability of promotion increased to 51 
percent; at 45 college credits the percentage increased to 
58 percent; and, finally, at 60 college credits obtained 
through VOLED, the percentage of those achieving E5 in 5 
years or less increased to 66 percent. 
These results are displayed in Figure 1 and in the 
regression results presented in Table 1 and Table 2.  Table 
1 shows the probability of participating in the VOLED 
program.  These regression results were used as a correction 
factor for selection bias when estimating the effects of 
VOLED on retention and promotion.  Table 2 analyzes the 
determinants of the probability of achieving the rank of E5  
 
 
                     
23 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40:23-24; 54, April 
1998.   
24 Ibid., p. 27.  
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in five years or less.  The marginal effects reflect 
percentage point change in the promotion probability from a 
one unit change in the desired variable. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Effect of VOLED participation on promotion 
College credits accumulated through VOLED 
 
Source:  Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 




























Table 1.   The probability of participating in the 
Voluntary Education Program probit estimates 
 
 
Source:  Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40, April 1998 
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Table 2.   The probability of reaching a determined 







Source:  Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40, April 1998 
 
Based on the ordered probit model for promotion (Table 
2), demotion was found to be inversely related to VOLED 
participation.  For sailors who did not participate in the 
VOLED program, 14 percent were demoted.  If VOLED 
participation was elected, then demotion fell to 7 percent 
for those who attended academic skills and 6 percent for 
those with college credit.25  This result is displayed in 
Figure 2 and also in Table 2. 
 
                     
25 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40:31, April 1998. 
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The results for the analysis of retention also 
indicated that VOLED had a positive effect on sailor 
reenlistment.  Sailors who never used the VOLED program 
reenlisted at a rate of 31 percent.26  Those who had used 
the VOLED program and obtained 15 college credits had a 37 
percent probability of reenlisting.  Much like the promotion 
scale, as the number of college credits increased so did the 
percentage of sailors who reenlisted or extended.  The top 
of the scale was 60 college credits accumulated through the 
VOLED program, which corresponded to a reenlistment rate of 
55 percent.27  The regression estimates for the factors that 
determine the probability of participating in the VOLED 
program are displayed in Table 3.  The regression estimates 






















                     
26 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40:32, April 1998. 


























Figure 2.   Participation in VOLED and Demotion 
 
Source: Federico E. Garcia et al, Effectiveness of the Voluntary 





















Table 3.   The probability of participating in the 






Source:  Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40, April 1998 
 
The results from Table 3 were used to estimate a 
correction factor for selection bias in the decision to 
participate in VOLED.  Table 4 displays the probability of 
reenlisting using the sample selection correction factor 
(The Inverse Mills Ratio) from the Heckman two step  
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estimates.28  The Heckman estimator controls for the 
probability that participants in the VOLED program are self-
selected based on, for example, motivation or ability. 
 
Table 4.   The probability of reenlisting: Probit estimates 
for sample selection 
 
                     
28 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40:61, April 1998. 
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Source:  Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 




As Table 4 shows, most variables are positive and 
statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence 
level.  In other words, the VOLED program enhances retention 
almost across the board.  Had there not been a VOLED program 
in place retention levels would have been lower. 
CNA also conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the VOLED 
program to determine whether the program was cost effective.  
The replacement costs of a sailor were calculated by 
estimating an average cost of training invested in the 
sailor by the end of their first enlistment.  The breakout 
for the costs were:  Recruiting: $5,163; Bootcamp: $6,668; 
A-school/apprenticeship training: $6,902; C-school: $4,251; 
Team training: $426; and Fleet training: $890.  The total 
was calculated to be $24,301 (FY 1998 average from frist 
term sailors)29.  If a sailor reenlisted and used less than 
$24,301 of VOLED funds, then the VOLED program is said to be 
cost effective. 
Figure 3 below discusses the cost effectiveness of the 
program per course completion.  The authors estimated that 
course completion was under $500 for all courses.  From 
Figure 3 Instructor PACE was the cheapest and Technology 
PACE was the most expensive program.  Considering other 
programs funded by the Navy, Figure 3 shows that VOLED is 
truly low cost.  All dollar amounts are expressed in 1998 
dollars.30 
 
                     
29 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40:23, April 1998. 
30 Ibid., pp. 33-35.  
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Figure 3.   Cost per course completion 
 
Source:  Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40, April 1998 
 
 
Figure 4 displays the costs of increasing college 
enrollments by 1,000 (on the left hand panel).  Based on 
their findings, the authors report that in each case the 
benefits (on the right hand panel) exceed the cost of the 
program.  For Instructor PACE and TA, the Navy’s benefit 
ratio is calculated to be 2:1.  For Technology PACE the 
benefit cost ratio is 1:1.  The benefits stem from the 
reduction in requirements for training new recruits because 




                     
31 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40:35, April 1998. 
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Figure 4.   Benefits and Costs of increasing college 
enrollments by 1,000 (in FY 1998 dollars) 
 
Source:  Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40, April 1998 
 
Figure 5 displays the results of the cost effectiveness 
analysis for the academic skills portion of the VOLED 
program based on increasing enrollment by 1,000 courses.  
Figure 5 also demonstrates that remedial education is very 
cost effective for the Navy.  When academic skills classes 
are taught through Instructor PACE the Navy receives $14 
from improved retention rates for every $1 that is invested.  
When the academic skills classes are delivered through 
Technology PACE, a savings of $22 is realized for every $1 
invested.  Finally, if academic skills classes are delivered 
through the actual learning centers, the savings is reduced 
to $9 for every $1 invested.  This program is more cost 
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effective than any other portion of VOLED.  As with the 
other finding, all amounts are reported in 1998 dollars.32 
Based on these graphs and observed the increase in 
retention associated with VOLED, the report concludes that 
the VOLED program is cost-effective across all components.  
This stems largely from the reductions in recruit training 
costs due to the improved retention of the existing force.  
Arguably, the program is only cost effective when a high 
percentage of sailors complete the courses that they sign up 
for.  Figure 6 shows completion rate of college course by 
Navy VOLED users as compared to their civilian counterparts. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Benefits ad Cost of increasing academic skills 
enrollment by 1,000 (in FY 1998 dollars) 
 
Source:  Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40, April 1998 
 
 
                     
32 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40:36, April 1998. 
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Figure 6.   Comparison of Navy and civilian course 
completion rates 
 
Source:  Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40, April 1998 
 
Given that the Navy sailors complete their course more 
often then their civilian counterparts, the authors conclude 
that the program is once again judged cost effective. 
Additionally, the study provided data that seemed to 
support the fact that sailors who participated in the VOLED 
program often cross-rated to more technical rates and were 
more successful at these rates than sailors who did not 
participate in the program.  Figure 7 shows that sailors who  
participated in the VOLED program cross-rated, or switched 
their rates, at a higher percentage than sailors who did not  
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participate.33  Although not really emphasized in the study, 
women and minorities were more likely to use VOLED than 
their Caucasian male counterparts.34 
 
 
Figure 7.   Participation in VOLED and cross-rating 
 
Source:  Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40, April 1998 
 
4. Study Recommendations 
Given these results, CNA recommended full support for 
the VOLED program, continuation of the establishment of the  
SMART transcript program, encouragement of a more supportive 
command climate toward VOLED and modification of the ASLC 
contract to promote greater participation.35 
                     
33 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 






Since its publication, a number of flaws in the study 
have been identified by later studies.  The first flaw 
discussed by follow-on studies was that the models in the 
VOLED study were too simplistic.  Using a more complex model 
with the additional variables of job satisfaction, 
satisfaction with the military way of life, and civilian 
employment prospects, the effect of VOLED on reenlistment 
rates, promotion, and cross-rating would be much smaller 
than estimated in the CNA study. 
Another flaw discussed was the differences across 
sailors in the opportunity to use the VOLED program.  It has 
been argued that the CNA study only measured the behavior of 
sailors who stayed to the end of their enlistment contracts 
and who had the opportunity to utilize this benefit. Sailors 
who attrited did not have the same opportunity to use the 
VOLED program.  If the opportunity factor is controlled for, 
then the TA portion of the VOLED program could actually have 
a negative effect on reenlistment. 
The opportunity factor is a valid argument because the 
CNA study sample focused on sailors who had an initial 
contract of four years of service.  The sample compared 
sailors who reenlisted or extended for more than one year 
against all sailors who entered the Navy in the original 
cohort even if the sailors attrited service before their 
obligation was complete.  Since the reenlisting sailors 
stayed longer, they had more opportunity to use the TA 




restricted to only those sailors who stayed to the 
reenlistment decision point.  In this way all sailors in the 
sample would have and equal opportunity to use VOLED. 
It also can be pointed out that another problem with 
the study was that the study combined all the different 
components, (TA, PACE, SLC etc.), of the VOLED program 
together.  This can skew the results because the educational 
goals of the separate components of VOLED are different, as 
are the goals of the sailors attending them.  This would 
affect the outcome of the students’ participation in the 
program and could also affect the outcomes. 
B. EMPLOYER FINANCED GENERAL TRAINING 
Prevailing labor economic theory states that employers 
are reluctant to fund employee general training for fear of 
generating a higher turnover and losing the cost of the 
training even though workers’ productivity could be 
increased through the training and firms would be better 
off.36  Researchers have argued both sides, and in 2002 the 
article “Does Employer Financed General Training Pay?  
Evidence from the US Navy,” appeared in the Economics of 
Education Review.  The article tackled the issue of 
protecting employer investments with regard to supplying 
additional worker training.  This article was written using 
the U. S. Navy as the employer.  The authors were Federico 
Garcia, Jeremy Arkes, and Robert Trost.  Federico Garcia was 
also an author on the CNA VOLED study and the same data that  
 
                     
36 Federico Garcia et al., “Does Employer-Financed general training 
pay?  Evidence from the US Navy,” Economics of Education Review, 21:19, 
October 11, 2000. 
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was used for the CNA study also was used in the analysis in 
this article.  In essence, the article represented an 
improved version of the CNA study. 
On average, most Navy enlistments expire in four years. 
If a sailor reenlisted or extended to the six year point, 
then it can be assumed that the Navy would recoup the cost 
of additional training. 
The Navy provides additional training and education 
through the VOLED program.  Although the Navy is not a for-
profit organization, it is subject to reducing costs and 
eliminating programs that are not efficient.  So the 
question posed in this article, “Does VOLED increase the 
probability that service of members will achieve the six 
year decision point?”37 
1. Data 
The data sample included recruits who entered in FY 
1992 with no prior military experience and with contracts up 
to four years.  Total sample size for this research was 
44,441 observations.  This is essentially the same data set 
as used in the CNA study.38 
2. Statistical Model 
The model chosen for this article was a bivariate 
probit model.  This two step-recursive model shown below was 
chosen to model the effect of VOLED participation on 
retention; 
                     
37 Federico Garcia et al., “Does Employer-Financed general training 
pay?  Evidence from the US Navy,” Economics of Education Review, 21:20, 
October 11, 2000. 
38 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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∗ = α +
∗ = + δ +
V Z( ) n
C XB (V u) 
 
where V* is an unobservable propensity to participate in 
VOLED, Z is a vector of characteristics associated with 
participation, C* is an unobservable index denoting 
propensity to continue in the Navy for six years and X 
includes demographic and career variables associated with 
continuation of Naval Service.39  
3. Findings 
In determining what predicts participation in VOLED, 
the bivariate probit model showed that a high AFQT score, 
being female, being younger, being a minority, or being 
single are all associated with a higher likelihood of 
participating in the VOLED program.  The dependant variable 
for the regression was participation in any componet of the 
VOLED program, the sample size was 44,441 and the base case 
for educational background was a high school graduate.40  
These results for predicting participation are shown in 
Table 5. 
                     
39 Federico Garcia et al., “Does Employer-Financed general training 
pay?  Evidence from the US Navy,” Economics of Education Review, 21:23-
24, October 11, 2000.  
40 Ibid., p. 24. 
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Table 5.   The determinants of participation in the VOLED 
program 
 
Variable      Estimate (standard error) 
Constant  -1.769*** (0.078) 
Attended academic orientation   0.845*** (0.053) 
session 
AFQT score/100  1.071*** (0.049) 
Female  0.358*** (0.020) 
Age when entering the Navy  -0.007**  (0.003) 
African–American  0.070*** (0.022) 
Hispanic  0.183*** (0.024) 
Asian/Pacific-Islander  0.397*** (0.043) 
Married -0.073*   (0.038) 
Single parent -0.048    (0.074) 
GED/No HS diploma  -0.233*** (0.049) 
More than high school  -0.216*** (0.059) 
General detail: two- and three-  0.113*** (0.028) 
year contracts 
General detail: four-year  0.320*** (0.027) 
Contracts 
 
*** Statistically significant at 1 percent level, ** Statistically 
significant at 5 percent level, * Statistically significant at 10 
percent level. 
 
Source:  Economics of Education Review, 21 (2002) 19-27 
 
The effect of VOLED participation on continuation in 
the Navy for six years was explained via two versions of the 
continuation equation.41  The first set of estimates was 
taken from a standard probit model, and the second set of 
estimates were taken from a bivariate probit model.42  This 
was done because the first estimation assumed the VOLED 
participation decision point was independent of retention.  
The second estimation correlated the unexplained propensity 
                     
41 Federico Garcia et al., “Does Employer-Financed general training 
pay?  Evidence from the US Navy,” Economics of Education Review, 21:25, 
October 11, 2000. 
42 Ibid., p. 25. 
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to continue to the six-year decision point (the error term 
in the retention model) with the unexplained propensity to 
participate in VOLED (the error term in the participating 
equation). The results in Table 6 are from a standard probit 
model (columns 1 and 2) and a bivariate probit model 
(columns 3 and 4).  For the standard probit model, VOLED 
participation decision was independent of the six-year 
continuation decision.  The Bivariate probit model 
correlated the propensity to participate in VOLED with the 
propensity to continue to the six-year decision point.43  
The results reveal that sailors that participate in the 
VOLED program are more likely to continue Naval service for 
six years than those who did not participate.  Table 6 shows 
that the coefficient of the VOLED participation variable is 
positive for both sets of regressions.44   
The results did answer the original question of “Does 
VOLED increase the probability that service of members will 
achieve the six year decision point?”45  The result show 
that in most instances it does.  That result is expected 
though, because the data set is the same as in the original 
CNA study.  If that is the case, then the argument that 
continuing to fund general training will benefit the Navy is 
also supported.  According to the results above, it can be 
calculated that the Navy saved approximately $53 million 
annually (1998 dollars) via the reduction of turnover.  In 
1998 the VOLED program cost the Navy $57.8 Million dollars.  
                     
43 Federico Garcia et al., “Does Employer-Financed general training 
pay?  Evidence from the US Navy,” Economics of Education Review, 21:25, 




The program almost paid for itself.46  Finally, other noted 
attributes of the VOLED program is the recruiting benefits 
obtained by marketing this program to potential recruits, 
which was not covered in this article. 
 
Table 6.    Effect of VOLED participation on continuation 
in the Navy for six years 
 
Variable      Estimate (standard error) 
Standard probit    Bivariate probit  
Constant  -1.148*** (0.069)  -1.146*** (0.070) 
Participated in VOLED   0.413*** (0.019)   0.576*** (0.111) 
AFQT score/100  -0.080*   (0.045)   -0.119**  (0.052) 
Female  -0.064*** (0.020)  -0.078*** (0.022) 
Age when entering the Navy   0.016*** (0.003)   0.016*** (0.003) 
African–American   0.453*** (0.018)  0.450*** (0.019) 
Hispanic   0.196*** (0.023)   0.189*** (0.023) 
Asian/Pacific-Islander   0.571*** (0.039)   0.554*** (0.041) 
Married   0.155*** (0.033)   0.158*** (0.033) 
Single parent   0.076    (0.065)    0.078    (0.064) 
GED/ No HS degree   0.104**  (0.042)   -0.096**  (0.043) 
More than high school  -0.016    (0.055)   -0.007    (0.055) 
General detail: two- and  
three-year contracts  -0.079*** (0.023)  -0.083*** (0.023) 
General detail: four-year contracts   0.223*** (0.022)   0.212*** (0.024) 
Unemployment rate   0.004*** (0.001)   0.004*** (0.001) 
Correlation between the error terms      -0.091    (0.061) 
 
*** Statistically significant at 1 percent level, ** Statistically 
significant at 5 percent level, * Statistically significant at 10 
percent level. 
 
Source:  Economics of Education Review, 21 (2002) 19-27 
4. Flaws   
There were flaws pointed out throughout the article by 
the authors.  In their opinion, the equation and methods 
were not without weaknesses, but their methods and 
approaches were justified so the results are reliable 
nonetheless.  However, VOLED is a continuing education 
                     
46 Federico Garcia et al., “Does Employer-Financed general training 
pay?  Evidence from the US Navy,” Economics of Education Review, 21:25, 
October 11, 2000. 
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program, not a training program.  The Navy views training 
differently than education, as does most academic 
institutions.  Private businesses, might view the two as the 
same.  If the point was to address training concerns, not 
continuing education concerns, then perhaps this article 
would be more relevant to the Navy.  
Additionally, this study suffers from the same flaw as 
the CNA study.  All the VOLED programs were combined 
together, when each program with the VOLED system should 
have been analyzed independently. 
Nonetheless, this research and their conclusions are 
useful.  As pointed out by the authors, the decision to stay 
or leave the Navy (or a business) at the six year point is a 
much more complex decision than whether or not continuing 
education is funded by the employer. 
C. RAND STUDY 
The Rand Corporation published a study that analyzed 
the TA program by itself for the Navy and Marine Corps 
entitled Tuition Assistance Usage and First Term Military 
Retention by Richard Buddin and Kanika Kapur.  This study 
also tried to replicate the CNA study and the Economics of 
Education Review study as well as eliminate some of the 
perceived flaws as already noted.  Both studies shared the 
same goal but approached the analysis differently.  If the 
researchers could demonstrate how TA affected retention in 
their sample, then they could use their models and analyze 
the data set from the CNA study to test the robustness of 




The data for the study was based on the first term 
retention decisions of enlisted service members from the 
Navy and Marine Corps during FY 1997 and half of FY 1998.47  
The records acquired displayed service members’ TA usage 24 
months prior to the reenlistment decision.48  The research 
was further restricted by only including in the sample 
service members who successfully completed their first 
contract.  This restriction was necessary to correct the 
flaw in the earlier CNA and the Economics of Education 
Review study.  Additionally, data on demographics, pay 
grade, pay components and deployment was obtained from the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).  For the second part of 
this study, the authors used data for the FY 1992 cohort in 
order to replicate the CNA study.49 
2. Statistical Model 
A bivariate probit (two-equation) model was specified 
to analyze TA usage and the effects of TA on retention.  The 
goal of the first equation was to isolate the direct effect 
of various factors on TA usage.  The second probit equation, 
was estimated to compare the reenlistment rates of sailors 
who utilized the TA Program against those who did not.50  
The authors also estimated retention based on a propensity 
score matching technique in order to test the robustness of 
their bivariate probit results. 
                     
47 Richard Buddin and Kanika Kapur, Tuition Assistance Usage and 
First Term Military Retention, RAND Corporation, 2002, p. 22. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., p. 22. 
50 Ibid., p. 15.  
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3. Findings 
Table 7 displays the bivariate probit results.  
Determinants of TA usage are displayed in columns 1 and 2 
while retention results are displayed in columns 3 and 4. 
Buddin and Kapur discovered that women are more likely 
to use TA than men, and that age and sailor aptitude did not 
make a difference in TA usage.  Family responsibilities, 
(married, single parents), of a service member showed a 
slight negative effect on TA usage.  Shore- based personnel 
are more likely to use TA than ship-based personnel.  Of 
greater importance, the final result showed that sailors who 
utilized TA were less likely to retain than those who did 
not use it, a result that contradicts the findings in the 
earlier study.51  The regression models for Table 7 for the 
Navy, use data from cohort FY 1997 and half of cohort FY 
1998.  The column labeled df/dx shows the partial effect of 
the estimated probit coefficients.  The partial effects for 
TA usage shows that TA users were nearly nine percent less 
likely to reenlist.  This result contradicted the positive 








                     
51 Richard Buddin and Kanika Kapur, Tuition Assistance Usage and 
First Term Military Retention, RAND Corporation, 2002, p. 49. 
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Table 7.   Bivariate probit model results for TA usage and 
first term retention in the Navy 
 
  TA Usage   First Term Retention 
Characteristic dF/Dx  Standard  dF/dX  Standard Mean 
     error    error 
 
TA usage in the 
Past 2 yrs   -0.0892* 0.0393 0.0804 
Age 0.0009 .0006 0.0092* 0.0012 23.8702 
Female 0.0607* 0.0077 0.0239 0.0142 0.1433 
Black -0.042 0.0031 0.1967* 0.0092 0.1860 
Hispanic 0.0228* 0.0045 0.0651* 0.0103 0.1044 
Asian/PI 0.0211* 0.0079 0.1925* 0.0153 0.0380 
Cat I AFQT 0.0473* 0.0087 0.0534* 0.0155 0.0253 
Cat II AFQT 0.0238 0.0038 0.0063 0.0057 0.3294 
Cat III AFQT 0.0097* 0.0030 0.0018 0.0053 0.2537 
NHS Grad -0.0208* 0.0081 0.0522* 0.0238 0.0122 
Alternative Ed -0.0105 0.0068 0.0244 0.0225 0.0252 
Some College -0.0093 0.0067 -0.0519* 0.0195 0.0176 
Single Parent -0.0300* 0.0031 0.0973* 0.0161 0.0599 
Married Parent -0.0339* 0.0028 0.1372* 0.0196 0.1186 
Married Nonparent -0.0184* 0.0030 0.0917* 0.0149 0.2673 
Joint Mil. Mar. -0.0049 0.0055 0.0490* 0.0172 0.0279 
Skilled Tech. 0.0272* 0.0043 0.1797 0.0115 0.2469 
Support&Admin 0.0463* 0.0048 0.1866* 0.0102 0.1244 
Electrical/Mech -0.0073* 0.0030 0.0706* 0.0128 0.3169 
Craftsman, Supply -0.0060 0.0056 0.1003* 0.0122 0.0981 
NR of Deployments 
In the last 2 yrs -0.0148* 0.0031 0.0194* 0.0065 1.4431 
 
Months Deployed in 
Past 2 yrs 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0036 0.0021 5.5604 
 
Lives in Off Base 
Housing 0.0215* 0.0043 0.0039 0.0103 0.3390 
 
Retention Decision 
FY 1997 -0.0039 0.0027 -0.0004 0.0060 0.7585 
Stationed Overseas 0.0377* 0.0114 0.1020* 0.0320 0.0273 
Assigned to a Ship -0.0471* 0.0113 -0.0431* 0.0199 0.7223 
Size of Base -0.0062 0.0020 -0.0111* 0.0041 0.2141 
Distance to 4 yr 
College -0.0002* 0.0001   21.2623 
 
NR of schools  
On base -0.0047 0.0025   3.259 
 
Proportion  
Staying at end of 
First term   0.1215 0.0802 
 
Sample Size          32712 
 
Source:  Tuition Assistance Usage and First-Term Military Retention, 
RAND Corporation, Richard Buddin, Kanika Kupur, 2002 
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The propensity score matching technique was then 
applied to estimate the key parameters to determine their 
robustness.  Propensity score match, as defined by Shenyang 
Guo, Richard Barth, and Clarie Gibbons, employs a predicted 
probability of group membership (in this case TA users and 
non-TA users) based on observed predictors, usually obtained 
from logistic regression to create a counterfactual group.52  
Additionally, Propensity scores may be used for 
matching or as covariates (alone or with other matching 
variables or covariates).  There is a limitation to 
Propensity Score Matching that needs to be addressed.  If 
the groups being matched do not overlap, then errors may be 
introduced into the results.  For this study, TA users and 
non-users were matched based on similar characteristics.  
This matching was needed in order to eliminate the 
differences in means of the covariates between the groups.  
The goal of this technique is to eliminate selection bias in 
who chooses to participate in the TA program. 
The results from the matching process show that a 
sailor who utilizes TA has a 10.8 percentage lower 
probability of reenlisting at the end of their first term 
than a sailor who is a non-user of TA.  This estimated 
effect was similar in magnitude and significance to the 
authors’ results from the bivarate probit model.53 
Table 8 shows the before and after matching numbers.  
After the matching process, the numbers for the variables 
                     
52 The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, School of Social 
Work, Jordan Institute for Families, Virtual Resource Community, 
www.ssw.unc.edu/vrc/lectures/psm_sswr_2004.ppt (last accessed March 
2007). 
53 Ibid., p. 46. 
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changed significantly resulting in many variables becoming 
negative or close to zero.  After the matching process is 
completed it can be determined that TA users do not retain 
as well as non TA users.54  This clearly can be seen by the 
Retention variable which continues to show a negative 
effect. 
Since the results of the TA analysis in the Rand study 
differed from the CNA study, the methodology was applied to 
the same data used in the CNA study in an effort to 
replicate the CNA study.  For the reexamination of the TA 
portion of the CNA study, length of service was held 
constant at four years, and the FY 1992 cohort data were 
used.  Rand obtained the results in Table 9.  Upon 
examination of Table 9, it is clear that TA users have a 
continuation rate five percentage points lower than those of 
non-users and the reenlistment rate for users of TA is six 














                     
54 Richard Buddin and Kanika Kapur, Tuition Assistance Usage and 
First Term Military Retention, RAND Corporation, 2002, pp. 39-48. 







Table 8.   Two Tailed T-Test of Covariate Means (TA Users 
Minus Nonusers) before and After Matching for 
the Navy 
 
 Before After 
 Matching Matching 
Characteristic 
Age  3.73* –1.35 
Female  39.97* 0.03 
Black  –2.91* –0.44 
Hispanic  3.99* –0.57 
Asian/Pacific Islander  2.97* 0.52 
Category 1 (AFQT 93–99 Percentile)  5.99* –0.60 
Category 2 (AFQT 65–92 Percentile)  11.21* 0.95 
Category 3a (AFQT 50–64 Percentile)  –0.70* 0.58 
Non–High School Graduate –2.80*  –0.65 
GED –3.23* 0.65 
Alternative Education Credential –2.90* 0.67 
Some College  5.07* 0.24 
Single Parent  –1.54  –1.47 
Married Parent –8.16* –0.80 
Married Nonparent  5.00* 0.33 
Joint Military Couple  10.55* –0.74 
Skilled Technical  18.93* –0.79 
Support and Administrative  17.27* 0.92 
Electrical/Mechanical  –17.81*    0.87 
Craftsmen, Service, and Supply Handlers  –8.87*  –0.63 
Number of Deployments in Past Two Years –37.22*   0.74 
Months Deployed in Past Two Years  –35.09*  1.32 
Lives in Off-Base Housing  15.76*  –1.27 
Retention Decision in FY 1997  –2.16*  –0.51 
Stationed Overseas 30.38* 1.35 
Assigned to a Ship  –48.98* 0.50 
Size of Base (in Logarithms)  –30.10*  1.44 
Distance to Four-Year College –4.58*  –0.40 
Number of Schools at Base  18.38* 0.13 
 
NOTE: Entries with asterisks are associated with differences in means 
that are 
significant at the < = 0.05 confidence level. 
 
Source:  Tuition Assistance Usage and First-Term Military Retention, 




Table 9.   Replication Analysis Probit Regression Results 
for Effect of TA Usage on Continuation and 
Reenlistment Rates of Four-Year Sailors in the 
FY 1992 Cohort 
 
 Continuation Rate Reenlistment Rate 
Variable Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard 
  Error  Error 
 
TA User 0.0502* 0.0209 -0.0590* 0.0276 
Female 0.0374* 0.0182  0.0403 0.0266 
Age at Entry 0.0056* 0.0026  0.0126* 0.0036 
Black 0.1295* 0.0170  0.01751* 0.0239 
Hispanic 0.0517* 0.0198  0.0840* 0.0276 
Asian/PI 0.1318* 0.0340  0.1559* 0.0461 
AFQT Score 0.0134 0.0075  0.0089 0.0103 
GED or No degree 0.0846 0.0700  0.2097 0.1092 
Some College 0.0376 0.0505 -0.0396 0.0675 
Single Parent 0.0504 0.0259  0.0397 0.0363 
Married 0.1786* 0.0129  0.1629* 0.0177 
Percentage of  
Time at sea -0.2916* 0.0711 -0.4306* 0.0995 
Percentage of  
Time at sea     
squared  0.5885* 0.0727 0.5705* 0.0990 
Electronic  
Equipment repair 0.0299 0.0271  0.0433 0.0366 
Comm/Intell 0.0751* 0.0287  0.0492 0.0377 
Health Care 0.2304* 0.0290  0.1992* 0.0392 
Other Technical 0.2455* 0.0668  0.2652* 0.0914 
Func. Support 
and Admin 0.1061* 0.0285  0.1573* 0.0391 
Elec/Mech Repair 0.0078 0.0236 -0.0113 0.0314 
Craftsman -0.1767* 0.0404 -0.2113* 0.0533 
Service/Supply 
Handler -0.0249 0.0306  0.0197 0.0421 
Undesignated -0.0613* 0.0228  0.0098 0.0316 
Constant -0.6291* 0.0734 -0.5715* 0.1031 
Proportion  
staying   0.2809 0.4214 
Sample Size 5383 3588 
 
Source:  Tuition Assistance Usage and First-Term Military Retention, 
RAND Corporation, Richard Buddin, Kanika Kupur, 2002 
 
Rand further stipulated that the stayer/leaver problem 
in the CNA study had to be addressed.  The CNA study did not 
account for those service members who dropped out of the 
1992 cohort before completing six years.  Typically, sailors 
who attrited before the six year point did so with only 2.3 
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years service.  These leavers did not have the full 
opportunity to utilize the TA program.  This could bias the 
final results in favor of the TA program.  Thus Rand deleted 
attriters from the sample and reestimated the model using 
the FY 1992 cohort data set.56  As Table 10 shows, Rand was 
able to replicate the Economics of Education Review result 
but demonstrated that TA users are less likely to remain in 
the Navy when attriters are appropriately omitted from the 
sample. 
                     
56 Richard Buddin and Kanika Kapur, Tuition Assistance Usage and 
First Term Military Retention, RAND Corporation, 2002, pp. 63-64.  
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Table 10.   Probit Regression Results for Effects of TA 
Usage on Navy Retention 
 
Equal Time Eligible for TA 
Dependent Variable Stay Sixth Stay fifth Stay fourth Stay Third 
 
Years Eligible . Years Year Year Year Year 
For TA Var 
  Variable     5     4      3      2 
Characteristic 
TA User  0.1355*  –0.0936*  –0.0628*  –0.0512* –0.0637* 
Female  –0.0407*  –0.0361  –0.0094  –0.0134   –0.0113 
Age at Entry   0.0066*  –0.0001   0.0152*   0.0018     0.0057* 
Black   0.1153*   0.0649*   0.1561*   0.0450*    0.0687* 
Hispanic   0.0437*   0.0079   0.0749*  –0.0007     0.0293  
Asian/Pacific 
Islander   0.1306*   0.0505   0.1820*   0.0656     0.1237* 
AFQT Score  –0.0043  –0.0106   0.0033   0.0078     0.0044 
GED or No Degree 0.0421   0.1595   0.0685  –0.0196     0.0563 
Some College  –0.0108  0.0642  –0.0563  0.0379   -0.0533 
Single Parent  0.0407  –0.0007  0.0887  –0.0012     0.0423 
Married  0.0452*  0.0058  0.0807*  0.0197     0.0303 
 
Electronic  
Equip Repair  –0.0102  0.0125  0.0099  –0.0460   –0.0166 
Communications/ 
Intell  0.0334  0.0193  0.0087  –0.0254    0.0975* 
Health Care  0.0725*  0.0069  0.1122*  0.0611*   0.0678* 
Other Technical  
and Allied  0.1241*  0.0451  0.1836  0.0099    0.2624 
Functional  
Support & Admin  0.0401  0.0138  0.1231*  0.0050    0.0009 
Electrical/Mech 
Equipment 
Repair  –0.0188 –0.0246 –0.0659* –0.0117    0.0200 
Craftsman –0.1086* –0.0807 –0.1882* –0.0678* –0.0016 
Service & 
Supply Handler –0.0330  –0.0389  –0.0381  0.0093   –0.0424 
Not Occupationally 
Qualified  –0.0857*  0.0004  –0.0134  0.0137   –0.0750* 
Two- or Three- 
Year Term  –0.1078*  0.0135  0.4116*  0.1298*  –0.5014* 
Constant  –0.3271*  0.2994* –0.3642*  0.1358     0.1961* 
Proportion   
Staying  0.2115  0.8714  0.4537  0.7975    0.7336 
Sample Size 7,819 1,898 3,491 4,377    5,942 
 
NOTE: The estimated effects (dF/dX) correspond to changes in the 
probability relative to the excluded reference category for discrete 
variables and the derivative of the probability for continuous 
variables. Entries with asterisks are associated with coefficients 
significant at the α = 0.05 confidence level. 
The reference categories for demographic variables in the model are 
male, white non-Hispanic, high school diploma graduate, and single with 
no children. The reference groups for military characteristics are 
infantry, gun crews, and seamanship specialists and four-year enlistment 
term. 
Source:  Tuition Assistance Usage and First-Term Military Retention, 
RAND Corporation, Richard Buddin, Kanika Kupur, 2002 
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4. Recommendations 
The study did not present recommendations, only 
conclusions/findings.  The highlighted findings are: 
1.   TA usage was higher for women and minorities than 
for other members. 
2.   TA Usage varies with rating/occupation code. 
3.   Members who are assigned to overseas billets are 
more likely to use TA.  Deployments decrease TA 
use. 
4.   TA may have important recruiting benefits that 
help recoup the cost of the program.  Most new 
recruits are interested in using TA at the start 
of their enlistment.  
5.   Congress and DOD have a long standing commitment 
to enhance the education of the military members. 
6.  TA Usage is associated with lower, not higher, 
retention.57 
5. Flaws 
The occupational ratings were grouped together, which 
could have skewed the results for these ratings.  For 
example, the Administrative/Support variable is not 
described at all.  It is not known exactly what ratings were 
lumped into this variable.  The same is true for the other 
grouped rating variables.  The broad spectrum of actual Navy 
ratings may not be detailed enough to accurately obtain the 
effect of the individual ratings.  This is important because 
a possible explanation is that sailors in various ratings 
may not use TA because that component of VOLED which is 
available to them is impractical.  If that is the case, a 
possible solution may be that more funding should be 
                     
57 Richard Buddin and Kanika Kapur, Tuition Assistance Usage and 
First Term Military Retention, RAND Corporation, 2002, pp. 49-51. 
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allocated to the Technology PACE instead of TA, to have 
VOLED more practical to sailors, as an example.  If access 
to the education is made easier for the end user, retention 
rates may increase.  If access is made difficult for the end 
user, that user will abandon the current institution in 
search of a new one. 
D. THE ARMY ACES STUDY 
In 2003 the United States Army Research Institute for 
the Behavioral and Social Sciences conducted an analysis of 
the Army’s VOLED program entitled, Impact of the Army 
Continuing Education System (ACES) on Solider Retention and 
Performance, authored by Sticha et al.  The Research 
Institute attempted to estimate the effects of the ACES 
program on first term retention.  
1. Data 
The data used in the retention analysis was based on 
records of all soldiers who entered the Army from FY 1996 to 
FY 1998, and who served at duty stations that maintained 
automated records of the soldiers’ participation in the ACES 
program.  203,630 service members were identified as being 
in the master cohort from FY 1996 to FY 1998.  From that 
sample 51,764 were stationed in locations where the 








final sample contained 43,831 records.  These records were 
combined with data records from DMDC to obtain the 
demographics data on the same soldiers.58   
To control for the opportunity to use TA, there was an 
indicator included in the bivariate probit model to 
distinguish whether the service member had a three- or four- 
year contract.  Only soldiers who were eligible to reenlist 
were included in the data set.59 
For promotion, the study considered the effects of four 
programs within the ACES system.  Those programs are TA, NCO 
Leader Skill Enhancement Courses, MOS Improvement Training 
(MOSIT), and the opportunities to take the Armed Forces 
Classification Test (AFCT).60 
2. Statistical Model 
The model used in this study was a bivariate probit 
model of promotion and retention.61  This model was chosen 
because it can predict two outcomes, and accounts for the 
correlation in the error terms of these two equations, TA 
participation and reenlistment.  The model was constructed 
for an unweighted sample set displayed in Table  
                     
58 Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003, pp. 28-29. 
59 Ibid., p. 31. 
60 Ibid., p. 47. 
61 Ibid., p. 31.  
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11.62  Using the information from Table 11, the model was 
estimated and produced the results displayed in Table 12. 
3. Findings 
Table 11 shows unweighted sample statistics for 
soldiers in the reenlistment analysis.  For this 
reenlistment measure only soldiers who were defined as 
eligible for reenlistment were considered.63  An eligible 
solider was one who had completed 2.5 years of service and 
who had a three year obligation or completed 3.5 years of 
service and who had a four year enlistment.64  It should be 
noted that this analysis was restricted to a sample of 
soldiers who were stationed at locations with the electronic 
educational accounting system.  After imposing these 
criteria on the data, the resulting sample used in the 
retention model regression was not random.  Since the sample 
is not representative of the entire first term enlisted 
population of the Army, the results in Table 12 cannot be 
used to make generalizations about the entire Army.   
Table 11 indicates that within the overall sample the 
reenlistment rate was 35 percent and TA participants 
reenlisted at a rate of 28 percent.  Soldiers who 
participated in Functional Academic Skills Training (FAST) 
reenlisted at a rate of 21 percent.  Table 11 shows that 
Soldiers with longer contracts used TA more than those with 
shorter contracts (an expected result because of greater 
                     
62 Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003, p. 34. 
63 Ibid., p. 31. 
64 Ibid. 
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opportunity to participate in TA.  Similarly, higher 
paygrade service members used TA more than juniors, and 
females participated in the program more than their male 
counterparts.  Soldiers with higher AFQT scores used TA 
more, while those with lower AFQT scores were more likely to 
use FAST.65 
 
Table 11.   Unweighted Sample Statistics for Soldiers in the 
Reenlistment Analysis of ACES Program 
 
Soldier 
Characteristic  Sample Size 
Rate of Participation 




 TA             FAST  
Overall  
All  10,597  28%  21%  35%  
Initial Contract Length  
3 Years  7,762  24%  22%  34%  
4 Years  2,835  39%  18%  37%  
Grade at ETS  
E1  130  20%  17%  13%  
E2  551  18%  15%  23%  
  TA FAST  
E3  4,141  23%  21%  36%  
E4  5,642  32%  21%  36%  
E5  133  54%  20%  47%  
Sex  
Male  9,254  26%  20%  35%  
Female  1,343  44%  26%  38%  
Marital Status at ETS  
Single  9,170  28%  21%  33%  
Married  1,427  30%  22%  46%  
Race  
Black  2,874  29%  28%  42%  
White  6,494  26%  16%  32%  
Other  1,229  33%  28%  36%  
 
 
    
                     
65 Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003,p. 32. 
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Soldier 
Characteristic  Sample Size 
Rate of Participation 




Hispanic Ethnicity  
Hispanic  1,234  33%  29%  36%  
Non-Hispanic  9,363  27%  20%  35%  
AFQT Category at Accession  
I  251  36%  8%  23%  
II  2,794  33%  11%  30%  
IIIA  2,609  32%  17%  37%  
IIIB  4,591  23%  29%  37%  
IV  352  19%  31%  44%  
Highest Education at Accession  
GED  1,350  24%  14%  42%  
HS Graduate  8,663  28%  20%  34%  
HS+  584  29%  22%  35%  
Accession Calendar Year  
1995  804  28%  27%  29%  
1996  4,072  32%  19%  34%  
1997  3,675  28%  21%  34%  
1998  2,046  20%  15%  41%  
 
Source:  Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003 
 
Table 12.   Bivariate Probit Results 
  








TA participation  .076**  .964**  .279 
FAST participation  .014**  .210**  .209 
SRB  .006**  .093**  .613 
Initial contract is 4 years  
(reference category is 3 years)  .022**  .149**  .159**  .268
Age at ETS  .0005  .125*  -.004  22.5 
female  .013  -.163**  .347**  .127
Married  .020**  .246**  .028  .135 
Black  .023**  .197**  .123**  .271 
Other Race  .011**  -.010  .160**  .116 
Hispanic  .010  -.042  .180**  .116 
AFQT category I  
(reference category is IV)  -.010  -.494**  .336**  
.024 
AFQT category II  .000  -.300**  .291**  .264
AFQT category IIIA  .007  -.150**  .242**  .246
AFQT category unknown  .006  .165*  -.062  .033 
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GED/Equiv. Exam  .014** .323**  -.099*  .127 
Post-high school education  -.014** .005  -.251**  .055 
Grade at ETS is E1  
(reference category is E4V)  -.028** -.613**  -.231  
.012 
Grade at ETS is E2  -.025** -.285**  -.299**  .052 
Grade at ETS is E3  -.008*  .036  -.160**  .391 
Grade at ETS is E5  .054** .044  .519**  .126 
Field Artillery (CMF 13)  .003  -.119**  .160**  .223 
Air Defense Artillery (CMF 14)  -.176** -.115  -.229**  .068 
Armor (CMF 19)  -.015** -.012  -.260**  .057 
Signal Operators (CMF 31)  -.002  -.099  .063  .084 
Mechanical Maintenance (CMF 63)  -.008  -.121*  -.011  .084 
Administration (CMF 71)  .040** -.211  .690**  .016 
Petro and Water (CMF 77)  -.008  -.201**  .058  .053 
Transportation (CMF 88)  .020** .452**  -.138  .040 
Supply and Services (CMF 92)  .010  -.049  .187**  .165 
Accession year is 1995  
(reference category is 1996)  -.017** -.111*  -.219**  
.076 
Accession year is 1997  -.001  -.035  .017  .345 
Accession year is 1998  .006  .137**  -.037  .193 
Intercept  -.975**  -1.039**  
State per capita expenditures for 
higher education  .00004 .0006**  452  
* p < .05; ** p < .01  
 
Source:  Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003 
 
The results from Table 12 indicate that there is a 7.6 
percentage point difference in the reenlistment rate of TA 
users, as compare to non-users, while FAST participants had 
a difference of 1.4 points.  Other significant predictors of 
reenlistment factors in the model were SRB level, having a 
four year contract, age, black, male married and lower AFQT 
category.66 
                     
66 Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003, pp. 37-38.  
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An analysis was conducted on first and second year 
attrition rates to try to discover if the ACES program had 
any effect on attrition.  The sample set for this analysis 
included soldiers who had completed the first six months of 
their enlistment.  This led to a sample size of 28,516.  Of 
those, only 1 percent participated in TA and 1 percent had 
participated in the FAST program during their first six 
months of enlistment.  For second year attrition criteria, 
completion of the first enlistment year was used.67  Only 
soldiers with three or four year contracts were used in the 
sample because it was determined that soldiers who had a two 
year contract could not be easily identified from those who 
separated early.  This led to a sample size of 24,662, of 
which 7.5 percent had participated in the TA program in 
their first year of enlistment and 4.5 percent had 
participated in FAST.  These sample statistics are not a 
reflection on the Army as a whole because “the soldiers in 
the sample systematically differ from soldiers in the Army 
as a whole.”68  The unweighted sample statistics are shown 






                     
67 Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003, p. 42. 
68 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
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Rate of Program 
Participation Through 
Beginning of Year  
Attrition 
Rate 
            TA  FAST  
Year 1 Attrition Analysis  
(analysis includes soldiers who reach 6 months of service) 
2-year 
contract  
1,677  2% 1%  6%  
3-year 
contract  
13,987  1% 1%  11%  
4-year 
contract  
12,852  1% 1%  12%  
Year 2 Attrition Analysis  




12,944  7% 5%  18%  
4-year 
contract  
11,678  8% 4%  19%  
 
Source:  Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003 
 
From the sample statistics a bivariate probit model was 
used to estimate results.69  These results are provided in 
Table 14 (First Year Completion) and Table 15 (Second Year 
Completion).   
                     
69 Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003, p. 41. 
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Table 14.   Estimated Marginal Effects of TA and FAST on 
First Year Completion Probability (Conditional 
on Completing First Six Months of Enlistment) 
 






TA participation   0.060 0.436  0.012  
FAST participation   0.061 0.442  0.009  
Initial contract is 2 years (reference 
category is 3 year contract)   0.035 0.216  0.059  
Initial contract is 4 years  -0.006 -0.032  0.451  
Age  -0.002 -0.010  21.596  
Female  -0.066 -0.316  0.147  
Married   0.004 0.021  0.124  
Black   0.008 0.043  0.252  
Other Race   0.026 0.154  0.103  
Hispanic   0.025 0.150  0.101  
AFQT category I (reference category is IIIB)   0.035 0.219  0.030  
AFQT category II   0.021 0.118  0.314  
AFQT category IIIA   0.008 0.044  0.304  
AFQT category IVA  -0.033 -.163  0.019  
AFQT category Missing   0.009 0.054  0.002  
GED/Equivalency Exam (reference category is HS 
grad)  -0.078 -0.360  0.106  
Post-high school education  -0.018 -.094  0.054  
Diver (CMF 00)  -0.521 -1.575  0.000  
Band (CMF 97)   0.070 0.558  0.001  
Field Artillery (CMF 13)   0.022 0.129  0.172  
Air Defense Artillery (CMF 14)  -0.052 -0.248  0.047  
Air Defense Artillery Crewmember (CMF 16)   0.013 0.077  0.003  
Armor (CMF 19)  -0.008 -0.043  0.066  
Air Defense System Maintenance (CMF 23)  -0.042 -0.204  0.002  
Paralegal (CMF 27)  -0.084 -0.373  0.005  
Signal Operator (CMF 31)  -0.027 -0.137  0.103  
Electronic Maintenance and Calibration (CMF 
35)  -0.020 -0.105  0.009  
Psychological Operations (CMF 37)   0.009 0.049  0.001  
Parachute Rigger (CMF 43)   0.065 0.495  0.001  
Financial Management (CMF 44)  -0.019 -0.097  0.000  
Artillery Maintenance (CMF 45)   0.023 0.137  0.008  
Public Affairs (CMF 46)  -0.081 -0.362  0.000  
General Engineering (CMF 51)   0.025 0.152  0.002  
General Engineering-Other (CMF 52)   0.029 0.178  0.002  
Ammunition (CMF 55)   0.023 0.134  0.013  
Supply and Services (CMF 57)  -0.006 -0.035  0.006  
General Engineering Equipment (CMF 62)   0.043 0.287  0.001  
Mechanical Maintenance (CMF 63)   0.038 0.237  0.069  
Aircraft Maintenance (CMF 67)   0.017 0.098  0.001  
Administration (CMF 71)  -0.007 -0.039  0.028  
Administration-Accounting (CMF 73)   0.008 0.044  0.005  
Chemical (CMF 74)  -0.139 -0.560  0.003  
Administration-Other (CMF 75)   0.045 0.297  0.028  
Medical Supply (CMF 76)   0.024 0.142  0.000  
Petroleum and Water (CMF 77)   0.036 0.229  0.041  
Topographic Engineering (CMF 81)  -0.016 -0.085  0.000  
Topographic Surveyor (CMF 82)   0.003 0.014  0.007  
Transportation (CMF 88)   0.053 0.364  0.032  
Medical (CMF 91)  -0.012 -0.063  0.003  
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Supply and Services (CMF 92)   0.027 0.156  0.148  
Aviation Operations (CMF 93)  -0.020 -0.103  0.006  
Military Intelligence (CMF 96)   0.027 0.162  0.001  
Signals Intelligence (CMF 98)  -0.316 -1.054  0.000  
Missing CMF  -0.479 -1.466  0.001  
Accession Year is 1995  -0.049 -0.236  0.043  
Accession Year is 1996  -0.028 -0.145  0.237  
Accession Year is 1997  -0.030 -0.157  0.292  
* p < .05; ** p < .01  
 
Source:  Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003 
 
From Table 14 it can be seen that participation in TA 
and FAST within the first six months of enlistment increased 
the completion rate for the first year by 6 and 6.1 percent, 
respectively.  The results in Table 15 show that second year 
completion rates are higher by 4.7 percent for TA users and 
5.7 percent for the FAST program. 
 
Table 15.   Estimated Marginal Effect of TA and FAST on 
Second Year Completion Probability (Conditional 
on Completing First Year) 
 






TA participation  0.047  0.194  0.076 
FAST participation  0.057  0.242  0.046 
Initial contract is 4 years (reference 
category is 3 year contract)  -0.010  -0.040  0.474 
Age  -0.001  -0.002  22.618 
Female  -0.099  -0.341  0.142 
Married  -0.022  -0.081  0.129 
Black  -0.010  -0.039  0.257 
Other Race  0.040  0.163  0.106 
Hispanic  0.034  0.135  0.103 
AFQT category I (reference category is IIIB)  0.051  0.217  0.028 
AFQT category II  0.031  0.119  0.301 
AFQT category IIIA  0.002  0.009  0.292 
AFQT category IVA  -0.037  -0.133  0.020 
AFQT category Missing  0.005  0.020  0.002 
GED/Equivalency Exam (reference category is 
HS grad)  -0.125  -0.417  0.107 
Post-high school education  -0.049  -0.174  0.054 
Diver (CMF 00)  -0.240  -0.714  0.000 
Combat Engineering (CMF 12)  0.145  0.909  0.001 
Field Artillery (CMF 13)  0.020  0.080  0.171 
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Air Defense Artillery (CMF 14)  0.040  0.162  0.046  
Air Defense Artillery Crewmember (CMF 16)  0.019  0.077  0.001  
Armor (CMF 19)  0.002  0.009  0.061  
Air Defense System Maintenance (CMF 23)  -0.029  -0.107  0.001  
Paralegal (CMF 27)  0.041  0.170  0.004  
Signal Operator (CMF 31)  0.014  0.056  0.100  
Electronic Maintenance and Calibration (CMF 
35)  0.057  0.247  0.009  
Parachute Rigger (CMF 43)  0.135  0.789  0.001  
Financial Management (CMF 44)  0.061  0.267  0.000  
Artillery Maintenance (CMF 45)  0.043  0.180  0.009  
Public Affairs (CMF 46)  0.116  0.608  0.000  
General Engineering (CMF 51)  0.094  0.453  0.002  
General Engineering-Other (CMF 52)  0.094  0.455  0.002  
Chemical (CMF 54)  0.076  0.348  0.000  
Ammunition (CMF 55)  -0.027  -0.100  0.010  
Supply and Services (CMF 57)  -0.001  -0.002  0.006  
General Engineering Equipment (CMF 62)  -0.099  -0.329  0.001  
Mechanical Maintenance (CMF 63)  0.036  0.147  0.068  
Aircraft Maintenance (CMF 67)  0.077  0.352  0.001  
Aircraft Maintenance-Other (CMF 68)  0.034  0.137  0.000  
Administration (CMF 71)  -0.022  -0.080  0.030  
Administration-Accounting (CMF 73)  -0.007  -0.025  0.005  
Chemical (CMF 74)  0.008  0.033  0.003  
Administration-Other (CMF 75)  0.045  0.188  0.031  
Medical Supply (CMF 76)  0.105  0.530  0.000  
Petroleum and Water (CMF 77)  0.025  0.101  0.041  
Topographic Engineering (CMF 81)  0.046  0.192  0.000  
Topographic Surveyor (CMF 82)  0.017  0.067  0.007  
Transportation (CMF 88)  0.065  0.285  0.031  
Medical (CMF 91)  0.001  0.005  0.004  
Supply and Services (CMF 92)  0.021  0.084  0.152  
Aviation Operations (CMF 93)  0.001  0.005  0.006  
Military Police (CMF 95)  -0.018  -0.066  0.000  
Military Intelligence (CMF 96)  -0.008  -0.032  0.001  
Signals Intelligence (CMF 98)  0.072  0.324  0.000  
Missing CMF  -0.456  -1.265  0.000  
Accession Year is 1995  -0.001  -0.005  0.042  
Accession Year is 1996  -0.029  -0.107  0.229  
Accession Year is 1997  -0.030  -0.112  0.286  
* p < .05; ** p < .01  
Source:  Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003 
 
Also discussed in the ACES study was that TA 
participation had a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the probability of retention.  This estimate was 
similar to the findings of Garcia et al. (2002), ”Does 
Employer-financed General Training Pay?  Evidence from the 
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U. S. Navy,” but is at odds with the Buddin and Kapur study.  
The ACES study attempted to control for opportunity to 
participate in the TA program and soldier attributes as did 
the Buddin and Kapur study.70  
4. Recommendations 
The study recommends that the Army expand the automated 
education record collection efforts to allow further study 
for the ACES program.  A cost benefit analysis was deemed 
impossible, but since there was a clear benefit in terms of 
retention, completion of first and second year, they 
recommended that the Army should continue to encourage self 
development programs like ACES in order to continue to 
transform the Army into a fighting force for this century 
and beyond.71 
5. Flaws 
This study did not conduct a cost-benefit analysis of 
the ACES Program or any component of it; Sticha et al. only 
reported that the program had positive effects on Army 
retention.  Since no cost effectiveness was completed, it is 




                     
70 Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003, p. 43.  
71 Ibid., pp. 71-76. 
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E. OCCUPATIONAL TRENDS IN THE CIVILIAN AND NAVY LABOR 
MARKETS 
In December 1991, LT Mike Haumer completed a Master’s 
Thesis entitled Occupation trends in the civilian and Navy 
Labor Market.  Here, LT Haumer explored the relationship 
between the civilian and Navy labor markets and attempted to 
show whether or not each one was trending toward or away 
from highly technical skills.  The understanding of this 
relationship would allow decision makers to be aware of 
consequences when budget cuts were allowed for sailors and 
equipment. 
1. Data 
The sample used to evaluate the civilian community was 
developed from the Current Population Survey (CPS).  The CPS 
interviews 57,000 households monthly and these interviews 
provide such demographic data as age, race, sex, marital 
status as well as employment status, occupation, and 
industry.  The population studies used in the Thesis were 
from March of 1980, 1985 and 1990.72 
The Navy samples were obtained from DMDC in Monterey, 
CA.  The data files contained the enlisted records from the 
Navy and Marine Corps from 1980 and 1990.  The data included 
demographic data, age, race, sex and occupational specialty 
codes.73 
 
                     
72 LT Mike Haumer, Occupational Trends in Civilian and Navy Labor 
Markets, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, December 1991, p. 11. 
73 Ibid., p. 12. 
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2. Statistical Model 
An occupational “crosswalk” matched civilian 
occupations to Navy ratings.  This process was developed by 
CNA for the DOD.  The first step in the process was to link 
the civilian occupations and the military ratings.  CNA 
researchers matched the military job code to the civilian 
Dictionary of Occupation Titles (DOT).  These DOT codes were 
linked to the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 
codes and census codes used in a separate crosswalk.  During 
this process, certain occupations were excluded from the 
overall sample due to incompatibility of terms of the 
different classification systems.  The final result was a 
matching of 41 percent of the Navy’s enlisted personnel and 
30percent of the civilian work force.74 
3. Findings 
LT Haumer reported that from 1980 to 1990 there was a 
5.6 percent change (showing an increase from 23.4 percent to 
24.7 percent) in highly technical ratings and a 3.8 percent 
change (showing an increase from 47.2 percent to 49.0 
percent).  The civilian results displayed a 120 percent 
change (and increase from 3.0 percent to 6.6 percent) for 
highly technical occupations and for technical occupations 
there was a -4 percent change (from 84.2 percent to 80.9 
percent).75  The findings support that the military and the  
 
 
                     
74 LT Mike Haumer, Occupational Trends in Civilian and Navy Labor 
Markets, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, December 1991, pp. 15-
18. 
75 Ibid., pp. 22, 24. 
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civilian labor markets are trending toward a highly 
technical occupation system, although not at the same rate 
of movement. 
4. Recommendations 
The main recommendation from this study was the Navy 
should continue to emphasize a highly technical and skilled 
occupational force.  Other recommendations discuss the 
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs), to retain sailors in 
highly technical ratings, and specific measures to analyze 
occupation specific earnings and employment trends in the 
civilian labor market.76 
5. Issues 
The author did not mention, or recommend, how these 
individuals should receive training for this, or who should 
fund it.  In order to have a high- or semi-technical 
workforce, the education and training measures have to be in 
place with the organization and the resources allocated for 
that program has to be examined.  Although it may not be 
viewed as a flaw, the failure to mention the education and 
training was an oversight worth mentioning. 
 
                     
76 LT Mike Haumer, Occupational Trends in Civilian and Navy Labor 
Markets, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1991, pp. 37-
41. 
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III. COMPARISON OF STUDY DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The studies discussed in the previous chapter attempted 
to determine how advanced education and retention are 
related.  Each study approached the question differently, 
each trying to improve upon the last.  This chapter will 
compare the research design of each study and attempt to 
determine if there is a significant difference in the design 
of each and if that difference could explain the reason for 
different outcomes. 
B. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VOLUNTARY EDUCATION PROGRAM (CNA 
1998) 
1. Data Samples and Sample Restrictions 
In the CNA study Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, the FY 1992 cohort was used for the 
analysis sample.  The sample used to analyze promotion 
outcomes consisted of all enlisted active duty sailors who 
accessed in the last two quarters of FY 1992.  The last two 
quarters were selected in order to track the promotion 
performance of sailors who joined six months apart.  The 
analysis of the demotion sample consisted of the FY 1992 
cohort of active duty sailors enlisted sailors (the four 
year obligors), which was tracked to the end of their first 
obligation.  This sample was used to compare the demotion 
rates of participants and non-participants.  For the 
analysis of cross-rating, undesignated apprenticeships 
(GENDETS) were omitted from the analysis sample.  Only 
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sailors who were rated were included in the sample.  For the 
analysis of retention, the FY 1992 cohort was used (four 
year obligors only).  The measure of retention included 
reenlistments and extensions of more than a year.77 
2. Methods to Deal with Selection Bias 
The method that was used to correct for selection bias 
was the Heckman Two Step process and the Inverse Mills 
Ratio.  Because sailors who pursue advanced education may 
not be representative of the population of enlisted 
personnel, the effect of VOLED on promotion may be 
overstated.  The main question is to what extent sailors who 
participated in VOLED would have been promoted faster even 
if they had not participated in VOLED.  The authors used the 
equation; 
* 'i i iZ Y w u= +  
Here *iZ  denotes participation in VOLED program, and iw  
is a vector of measurable factors that explain the choice to 
participate and iu  is a random error term.  The vector iw  
includes an instrument (variable) that is expected to affect 
participation in VOLED but not to affect the promotion or 
retention outcomes.78 
The equation for the Heckman two-step procedure for 
sample selection model is: 
                     
77 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40:19-21, 60, April 
1998. 











The procedure fits probit model for the selection 
variable iZ , where ˆ( )iYwφ  is the normal probability density 
function and ˆ( )Φ iYw  is the normal cumulative density 
function.  The ratio iλ  is also known as the Inverse Mills 
Ratio.  Next, the procedure estimates the selection 
corrected estimates of β  by regressing Y on X and λ .  The 
marginal effect of college credits, which is a component of 
the term X gives the promotion effect that is directly 
attributable to VOLED.  The marginal effect of the Inverse 
Mills Ratio gives the promotion effect that is attributable 
to the high motivation of VOLED participants.79 
C. RAND STUDY 
1. Sample and Sample Restrictions 
In the Rand study Tuition Assistance Usage and First-
Term military Retention, the focus was on the TA portion of 
the VOLED program only and the data used were collected from 
enlisted master files from FY 1997 and the first half of FY 
1998.  These files, obtained from DMDC, were combined with 
TA usage for the same timeframe.  This sample was restricted 
to TA only and the other components of the VOLED program 
were not analyzed.  Additionally, this study also used the  
 
 
                     
79 Federico E. Garcia et al., Effectiveness of the Voluntary 
Education Program, Center of Naval Analyses, CRM 98-40: 54-55, 60, April 
1998. 
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FY 1992 data set that was previously used in the VOLED study 
conducted by CNA in 1998 to see if the results could be 
replicated.80 
2. Methods to Deal with Selection Bias 
To deal with selection bias, the propensity score model 
and a bivariate probit model were used.  The bivariate 
probit model is estimated in two steps.  The first step 
estimates the probability of TA usage as a function of 
demographic characteristics, military environment, proximity 
to a four year college at accession, and the number of 
colleges offering courses at the member’s base.  From there, 
a prediction of TA usage is made based on each individual’s 
X and Z variables for the bivariate probit model (where X is 
is a vector of observed variables and Z measures the sailors 
taste for college classes and TA opportunities available at 
there base).81  The entire bivariate probit model for 
estimating TA usage is shown below: 
2 2i i i iTA x Zβ δ ε∗ = + +  
The prediction of a TA user from the model, or the 
propensity score, is then matched with a non-user of TA.  
Then, using the matched sample, a probability of retention 




                     
80 Richard Buddin and Kanika Kapur, Tuition Assistance Usage and 
First Term Military Retention, RAND Corporation, 2002, pp. 3-4. 
81 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
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1 1*i i i iR x TAβ γ ε= + +  
Here *iR  is the continuous measure of the tendency to 
reenlist.82 
D. IMPACT OF THE ARMY CONTINUING EDUCATION SYSTEM (ACES) 
ON SOLDIER RETENTION AND PERFORMANCE:  DATA ANALYSES 
In the study Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Solider Retention and Performance the 
Army’s ACES program was analyzed.  The analysis focused on 
retention and promotion outcomes. 
1. Sample and Sample Restrictions 
For the analysis of retention, the sample was 
restricted to first term enlistments from FY 1996 through FY 
1998.  Further, the data was also restricted to soldiers who 
were stationed at locations where automatic records of 
education participation were maintained.  Demographic data 
was obtained from DMDC and merged with enlisted education 
data.83 
The promotion selection for the Army is quite different 
from the Navy.  The Army operates selection boards for 
paygrade E-4 through E-9, whereas the Navy only holds 
selection boards for paygrades E-7 through E-9.  This fact 
has to pointed out because the Navy’s promotion system uses 
rating exams for grades E-4 through E-6, (an exam is held 
                     
82 Richard Buddin and Kanika Kapur, Tuition Assistance Usage and 
First Term Military Retention, RAND Corporation, 2002, pp. 18-19. 
83 Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003, pp. 28-29. 
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for E-7 in order to be board-eligible for selection to E-7).  
This is significant because less credence could be given to 
the ACES program on promotion as compared to the Navy.  An 
example could be a direct effect of VOLED/TA for the Navy 
would be a sailor who learns study skills and could apply 
those skills directly to advancement, (by studying harder 
for the rating exam).  In the Army, that study skill will 
not directly correlate because the Army holds a selection 
board for promotion.  That stated, the Army did explore the 
promotion outcome in their study. 
For the promotion model, data was collected from NCO21 
Validation Project and from the Army Enlisted Master file 
(EMF).  The NCO21 project contained the Promotion Point 
Worksheet (PPW) which included information on awards, 
medals, military and civilian education.  Also included were 
direct supervisors’ assessments of each soldiers progress.  
The sample for promotion included paygrades E-4, E-5, and E-
6.  Only soldiers who were eligible to reenlist were 
considered for inclusion in the data set.  Blacks and women 
were underrepresented in the sample at 27 percent and 13 
percent contrasted with the Army population of 30 percent 
and 15 percent, respectively.  Males and Caucasians were 
overrepresented at 47 percent and 32 percent compared to the 
Army population of 86 percent and 57 percent, respectively.  








paygrades E-4 and E-6.  There was also a difference in years 
of service: E-4’s had a median service length of three years 
while E-6’s had a median of 13 years.84 
2. Methods to Deal with Selection Bias 
A quasi-experimental design is used because it controls 
for factors that affect both assignment to a test group and 
the outcomes that a researcher desires to be analyzed.  
Additionally, numerous control variables were included in 
the multivariate regression to help minimize the potential 
problem of omitted variable bias.  Further, the study 
utilized a bivariate probit model for the regressions.85 
3. Summary 
Of all three studies, the Army ACES study appeared to 
be the most robust.  The Army study attempted to account for 
all the flaws that had been identified in the previous 
studies.  Although the retention effect is not as large in 
the Army ACES study as in the CNA study, the results 
indicate a positive effect of VOLED on retention and 
promotion.  The retention results contradict the results of 
the RAND study.   
There are some concrete reasons why the studies reach 
different conclusions.  First, service fit comes into  
 
 
                     
84 Paul J. Sticha et al., Impact of the Army Continuing Education 
System (ACES) on Soldier Retention and Performance: Data Analyses, 
United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences, June 2003, p. 47  
85 Ibid., pp. 20, 36. 
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question.  Did the CNA study show the true retention effects 
of TA usage, or did they simply prove that those who 
attrited did not use TA? 
Second, the Army markets its education benefits to 
incoming recruits more heavily than the Navy.  Thus, those 
who value education will be attracted to the service that is 
perceived to offer the best educational opportunities.  The 
Army has consistently marketed itself as being an excellent 
way to increase college courses, thus attracting people who 
value education.  These people may not have been able to 
complete their educational goals in their first enlistment 
and need to reenlist to complete their education program.   
Third, the studies used different model specifications 
and different approaches to control for the opportunity to 
use TA.  These different approaches have to be taken into 
account, as different model specification could yield 
different results.  For example, an ordered probit and a 
binomial probit model were specified for the VOLED study 
conducted by CNA using the Heckmen two-step process.  The 
RAND researchers utilized a bivariate probit model and a 
propensity score model.  The ACES study also used a 
bivariate probit model.   
To obtain a definitive answer on which study is more 
robust a study for the Navy would have to be commissioned 
that used the same approach as in the ACES study.  This 
would test whether the Army results could generalize to the 
Navy.  If consistent approaches are not used, different 
results will always be produced.  Since the Army tried to 
correct for the flaws conducted in the previous studies,  
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their study should be used as a baseline.  However, unless 
the service fit question can be answered, results from a 
given service may not be generalizeable to the others. 
Ultimately, the results of the Army study and the RAND 
study may be due to the fact that one analyzed Army 
enlisteds whereas the other analyzed Navy enlisteds.  The 
two service’s programs are likely to differ in structure and 
execution.  Moreover, as mentioned above, motivation of 
program users in the two services may differ.  Finally, 
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IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF A NEW GENERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The statistical studies previously reviewed focused on 
the current generation by examining cohorts from the early 
and late 1990s.  This section will concentrate on the future 
generation, (which is now emerging in the ranks of the 
military), how advanced education is valued, how access to 
that education being reduced, and finally, what the citizens 
of the next generation are going to do about it. 
B. MILLENNIALS MERGING:  LEADING A NEW GENERATION IN WAR 
This article, authored by LTCOL Wayne A. Sinclair, 
tries to explain how the latest generation of junior Marines 
is different than the previous generations and how leaders 
from previous generations can adapt to the new generations’ 
expectations.  This article provides a basic understanding 
of the Millennials generation, and guidance for current 
military leadership who are having trouble connecting with 
them. 
1. Millennials 
A new generation is begun to enter the Armed Forces.  
Dubbed the “Millennials” these are the new Soldiers, 
Sailors, Marines, and Airmen entering in the new century.  
This generation differs significantly from their 
predecessors, and in order to understand how to transform 
the military, the new wave of recruits and young officers 
should be understood first. 
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The Millennials are the latest cohort to be born in 
America.  Their birth years are from 1981 to 2002.  Other 
common names from this cohort are The Net Generation, 
Generation Y, and Echo-Boomers.  This latest generation is 
quite different from its predecessors Generation X (born 
between years 1961-1980 and the Baby Boomers (born between 
years 1943-1960).86  To understand how they differ, the 
origin of the Millennials has to be examined and predictions 
made about how the generation will react to ongoing world 
events. 
2. The World Around the Millennial Generation 
The Millennial generation arrived into the world in 
1981 when childbearing and family values became a national 
priority again.  Divorce rates in America were declining 
throughout the primary birth years (1981-2002), the economy 
was on the rise, and the birth rate during this period 
doubled as compare to the Generation Xers period (about 76 
million Millennials born).87  With these new changes in 
society and the economy, parents and educators tried to 
remove all the risk from the Millennial childhood and make 
the world a safer place for this new generation. 
Social institutions began to reform.  By the mid-1990’s 
most public school districts had adopted a policy of 
“accountability.”88  School systems were no longer funded 
blindly and parents began to get involved and ask the  
 
                     
86 LTCOL Wayne A. Sinclair, “Millennials Merging:  Leading a New 
Generation in War,” Marine Corps Gazette, 90:71, September 2006. 
87 Ibid., p. 72. 
88 Ibid. 
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question, “What is our ROI for our tax dollars?”  As a 
consequence, higher academic standards were enforced and 
“zero tolerance” policies took center stage.89 
The parent involvement for this new generation trended 
upward and soon parents became highly vested in their 
children.  The parent or guardian really paid attention to 
outcomes and results of programs that affected their 
children.  As a result, the children turned to their 
parents/guardian for advice, and often receiving coaching 
rather than counseling for dealing with life’s problems.90  
This is a sharp contrast to Generation X who grew up in a 
world of rising divorce rates, single parent families, and 
duel working parents. 
3. Generation X vs. Generation Millennial 
Generation X became known as the “latch-key kid” 
generation.91  Generation X also lived through turbulent 
times at home when divorce was at an all-time high.  If the 
divorce did not enter the home, then both parents had to 
work, and the absence of parents continued.  As a result, 
Generation X never fully embraced their parents as the 
Millennals do.  Generation X became self reliant, pragmatic 
and most often adopted a “go for broke” attitude.  Without a 
coach, Generation X wanted “just the facts” about any 
situation and then made a decision or a course of action.  
Since Generation X also had a childhood filled with 
uncertainty, this Generation embraced order and discipline 
                     
89 LTCOL Wayne A. Sinclair, “Millennials Merging:  Leading a New 
Generation in War,” Marine Corps Gazette, 90:72, September 2006. 
90 Ibid., p. 72. 
91 Ibid. 
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wherever it could be found.  The Millennial Generation has 
always known order, so they tend not to seek order out.  
Chaos disturbs the Millennial Generation, but Generation X 
thrives on it.92 
4. Millennial Values 
Much attention has been paid to the Millennial 
generation.  A highly noticed trait of this new generation 
is that they have had time to reverse some perceived 
negative attributes of their predecessor generations.  The 
Millennials are more civic minded, they tend to shy away 
from negative youth trends such as drug use, criminal 
activity, and teen pregnancies.93  The Millennials also 
thrive in the 21st century.  Multitasking has become their 
way of life.  Technology adoption is faster for them than 
most generations in the past.  The author argues since the 
Millennial generation has never known a world without the 
cell phone, the internet, laptop computers, their 
conceptions of time, space, and communications are 
drastically different than any generation before.94 
The Millennials are having a hard time adapting to 
military service.  Although a large number of them are civic 
minded and very patriotic, day-to-day military life, and the 
current Global War On Terror (GWOT), which is a breeding 
ground for chaos, is inconsistent with their upbringing.  
Table 16 below details the Millennials positive and negative 
military traits: 
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Table 16.   Millennial Military Traits 
 
Positive Military Traits  Negative Military Traits  
Used to order and structure  Unsettled by chaos and friction 
High self esteem    Can’t connect with difficult people 
Positive attitude    Have not experienced much loss 
Technologically savvy   Lack creative thinking 
Team collaboration   Trouble leading without consensus 
Determined to matter   Easily dejected by adversity 
Trusting of authority   Expect and need guidance 
Safety a priority    Averse to risk taking 
Thrive on multitasking   Prone to piecemeal efforts 
Good followers    Poor self discipline             
Source:  “Millennials Merging:  Leading a New Generation in War”, Marine 
Corps Gazette, LTCOL Wayne A. Sinclair, 2006 
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If there is agreement about these traits, it should not 
be a surprise that the Millennials expect ready made 
solutions to problems.  They prefer small units, oversight, 
structure, teamwork, methodology, and a cause greater than 
themselves.  The Millennials are not impressed with position 
or title.  They count on hands-on leaders who earn their 
respect by recognizing their potential and leaders who are 
willing to teach them and provide the tools necessary to 
succeed.95 
The military should recognize these differences and 
adapt to them.  Leaders need to understand that this 
generation led a sheltered existence compared to other 
generations, and the “sit and listen” technique of 
teaching/training may not work with this technology-driven 
generation.96   
5. Solutions to the Generation Gap 
LTCOL Sinclair suggests leaders apply their 
mentoring/coaching skills in the following ways:  Explain 
why and how things must be done (at least until the new 
service member understands his/her role in the 
organization), Establish boundaries, Clarify their roles in 
any venture, Enforce accountability, Show how opportunism 
and risk taking can be balanced, Teach self-assessment 
techniques, Teach project and time management, Provide 
feedback often.  The article also stresses that careful  
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96 Ibid., p. 74. 
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investments in this generation’s human capital is essential, 
because “human capital will continue to pay the highest 
dividends in war.”97 
C. APPLEBEE’S AMERICA:  THE 9/11 GENERATION 
Douglas Sosnik, Matthew J Dowd, and Ron Fournier 
published Applebee’s America in 2006 to explain how the 
emerging generations view the world, and how that view has 
changed from the “Greatest Generation” and the “Baby 
Boomers.”  The focus of the book centered around Generation 
Xers and their particular positions on various issues and 
how political and social leaders could use the understanding 
of the positions to win elections, and change social issues.  
The last chapter in the book introduces the 9/11 Generation, 
(called Millennias in the last article).  This introduction 
gives the reader a glimpse into the life of the follow-on 
generation, and how these 9/11ers differ from the Generation 
Xers. 
1. Social Changes and Generation 9/11 
The authors define Generation 9/11 as 18-to-24 year 
olds in 2005.98  Through surveys and interviews, the core 
values of these individuals are revealed and as well as 
their personal traits.  Their results are discussed below. 
Generation 9/11 is the most ethnically diverse 
generation in U. S. History.  The authors argue that the 
non-Caucasian population will increase, but that increase is 
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not the main cause of change.99  What will cause social 
change and drive the nation’s priorities will be these 
minorities ascending to positions of influence and elite 
status.  Young minorities are graduating from high school at 
higher rates than ever before.100  Most of these high school 
graduates desire a college education, as seen by the average 
graduating class from Harvard University where the minority 
graduation rate is approximately 30 percent and continuing 
to rise.101  Technology allows minorities to form their own 
online communities that bypass old cultural and class 
boundaries.  This gives way for minorities to prosper 
without bias.  The impact of this on the United States is 
clear.  Population experts have stated that minorities will 
make up a majority of the United States population by 
2050.102  The Census Bureau reports Texas, California, New 
Mexico and Hawaii already have majority minority populations 
and Maryland, Mississippi, Georgia, New York, and Arizona 
have 40 percent minorities.103  With these facts, it is easy 
to understand that diversity will have to be embraced in the 
future, and that intolerance will not be accepted. 
2. Women 
The second finding in the surveys was that young women 
outshine young men and that the women are changing the 
nation’s gender dynamics.  The authors contend that, 
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according to the National Center for Education Statistics, 
in 2005 universities were on track to give at least 200,000 
more Bachelor’s degrees to women than to men.  Additionally, 
women also seek graduate degrees more often then men.  
Generation 9/11 women are starting families later and 
teenage pregnancy is down for this generation and abstinence 
has increased.104 
How will these trends change society?  The family 
dynamics will continue to shift.  Women in this generation 
will have a harder time finding men with the same 
educational background as themselves.  Women will become the 
best and brightest.  The old “boys clubs” will run out of 
members, and women will take their place.  Women can and 
will occupy more important political and business positions 
in the coming years.105 
3. Opportunity Gap  
Another finding of the survey and research indicates 
that the opportunity gap for citizens will widen.  Members 
of Generation 9/11 with the right education will have 
boundless opportunities in the coming years.106  With the 
country moving into knowledge-based jobs and a highly 
technological workplace, advanced education will become 
essential in the coming years.  Those without the advanced 
education will not be able to climb the social ladder and 
their social mobility will be capped for another generation.  
Since college costs rising, not all high school students who 
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want to enter college and qualify scholastically will be 
able to enter.  These students are priced out of the market.  
The Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning 
and Engagement states that nearly half of current 18-to-24 
year olds have no college experience even though education 
will become increasingly important in the future.107  This 
Opportunities Gap will be an important issue for this 
generation.  With traditional educational avenues 
unavailable for some citizens who desire higher education, 
these same citizens will seek alternative and non-
traditional ways to obtain that advanced education so they 
can participate in the world around them. 
Technology is embraced by this generation more than any 
other.  This generation uses it to make their life easier, 
to connect to more people and to enjoy their life to the 
fullest.108  This quick adoption of technology is critical 
because if traditional institutions are not compatible with 
the 9/11 generation, then they will change them with 
technology or abandon them.  Cell phones are preferred over 
traditional phone lines, and this generation utilizes the 
internet for all their daily uses  Brand loyalty could 
decrease because switching costs are perceived as low. 
Final results reveal that the next generation will seek 
work-life balance and that money will not buy status for 
them.109  This generation was overscheduled from an early 
age, so in their prime years they will tend to slow down.  
Also, money is a tool that can provide items for them, and 
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not define them.110  This generation wants safety, quality 
education, and quality entertainment.111  They are willing 
to pay for it, but if the access is not there, then they 
could create alternate institutions to provide these items. 
D. GENERATION DEBT  
Anaya Kamenetz is the author of Generation Debt.  This 
book describes the life issues surrounding the Millennia 
generation, which she describes as Generation Debt.  The 
subjects included in the book are college education, low 
wage jobs, jobs without benefits, declining federal 
programs, and current family troubles.  Her book was based 
on thousands of interviews, emails, and phone calls from 
people living in New York New Orleans, San Francisco and 
Washington D.C.  All interviews were conducted in late 2004 
and early 2005. 
1. College and Money 
According to Kamenetz, almost two thirds of all 
students currently enrolled in college are financing their 
education with debt.112  This is a drastic change from years 
past.  “In 1981 45 percent of all federal undergraduate 
student aid dollars came in loans, 52 percent in grants.  By 
the end of the 1990s the proportion was reversed; loans make 
up 58 percent and federal funds made up 41 percent.”113  
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This statement displays a shift from government 
responsibility to provide access to higher education for 
citizens to the people themselves.  She continues to write, 
“Although the government doesn’t issue an official figure, 
studies in 2004 and 2005 put the average student loan debt 
for graduates of four year colleges between $17,600 and 
$23,485.”114  Most college students also utilize credit 
cards to fund their education when the education loans and 
the government resources are depleted. 
Rising tuition costs combined with fewer federal funds 
available to the population give rise to increasing debt of 
the next generation.  Colleges are raising their costs due 
to technology upgrades, marketing costs, and the simple fact 
that the market will bear these prices.115  The Can-do 
attitude of the Gen-Xers parents to the new generation finds 
ways to get their children through college, no matter the 
financial cost of that education to the student.  The 
consequence of this action can be severe and affect the 
future livelihood for the college student. 
When graduation arrives, the students’ debt repayment 
begins.  It becomes their responsibility to pay off the 
debt, and that responsibility generally damages the ability 
of starting a family or buying a house because the graduate 
simply can’t afford a lifestyle and the college debt on a 
low wage job.  The term “low wage job” applies to the recent 
college graduate because with a lack of work experience, 
starting wages will tend to be lower.  The superior earning 
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years will materialize, but not until after a sizeable 
amount of practical experience is gained and the workforce 
rewards that experience in conjunction with the education.  
Consequently, “Generation Debt” starts out behind pervious 
generations financially, and finds it exceptionally hard to 
maintain a lifestyle equal to their parents.116  
2. The Definition of Low Income Changes 
Traditional wisdom states that low income families are 
not affected by the increased debt a student is now carrying 
because most the federal funds go to them since they are 
truly needy.  This is not the case though.  Since tuition 
rates have increased, more students, even the middle class 
ones whose parents could afford to pay for their college, 
fit the new definition of low income and can compete for the 
federal funds that were not an option for them before.  
Since the federal funds have not increased even though the 
population competing for these funds has increased, the 
truly low income students receive even less federal aid.117 
3. Jobs without Benefits 
Along with higher education costs, higher loan debt and 
lower wage starting jobs there are additional costs of life 
that previous generations did not have to deal with.  Most 
jobs have lowered “fringe benefits” such as medical 
coverage, or worse there are no fringe benefits at all and 
the employee must fund 100 percent of their medical 
insurance.  In previous generations, medical, dental and 
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other coverage’s were part of a job, or at least the company 
paid the lion’s share of the coverage.  This often is not 
the case today.  With costly legacy costs, most companies 
are reducing both retirement benefits and medical benefits, 
just when medical costs are soaring and citizens in the 
workforce are saving less and less for retirement.  
According to the author the combination of rising tuition 
costs, low paying jobs without benefits, and higher debt 
accumulation the society is setting up the next generation 
for failure.118  As this country moves into a “Knowledge 
Economy” from a “Manufacturing Economy” advanced education 
will be a must, but if changes aren’t made, generation 
Millennia will be worse off then Generation X, a Generation 
whose standard of living has decreased as compared to the 
Baby Boom generation.119 
The members of the newest generation will aspire to 
join the knowledge workforce rather than the manufacturing 
workforce because more opportunities will exist within the 
knowledge workforce.  In general, children want to be better 
off than their parents.  Traditional college may not be a 
feasible for a large portion of the generation.  In that 
instance, a substitute will be sought out and the military 
VOLED program offers such a substitute. 
4. A Possible Solution:  A Case Study 
In her book, Kamenetz cites a young woman named Latoya 
who lived in South Philadelphia, PA.  She was working at a 
fast food restaurant for $6.25/hr and had attended a local 
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community college.  She cites that she joined the Air Force 
in search of a “better life.”  She was an intelligent 17-
year-old (in 2004) who graduated at the top of her class in 
high school, but could not maintain her life by going to 
work in the civilian labor force and attending community 
college.  So for her, the military, which offered her a job, 
training and education became a viable option.  It was all 
three attributes that convinced her that military service 
was right for her.  She valued a decent paying secure job 
with benefits and educational opportunities.  The author 
further cites that with the current GWOT and counter-
recruitment movements in large cities, the military has 
missed its recruiting goals (except for the Air Force).120  
5. Education and the Next Generation 
Kamenetz cites that the American Economic Association 
states that a bachelor degree holder is able to earn 
approximately 45 percent more money on average than high 
school graduates, as of 2005.121  It can be demonstrated 
that the Generation Debt/Generation Millennia believes this 
because college enrollments are increasing not decreasing.  
Although critics may argue that students are enrolling based 
on other non-monetary values, the author argues that the 
“monetary” factor cannot be ruled out.  The educational 
system is in need of change or another generation will 
suffer needlessly. 
 
                     
120 Anya Kamenetz, Generation Debt: Why Now Is A Terrible Time To Be 
Young (New York 2006), pp. 61-64. 
121 Ibid., p. 74. 
 88
E. THE CNO AND DIVERSITY 
On February 5, 2007 the CNO released his guidance to 
the Navy for calendar year 2007.  From his guidance, the CNO 
states “I consider diversity a strategic imperative for our 
Navy and vital to our ability to accomplish the mission.”  
At the heart of the Develop 21st century leaders concept is 
diversity.  The CNO further states, “We will drive to 
execution of the diversity conops in 2007 and will refocus 
our energies on recruiting, developing, educating, and 
retaining leaders from and for all parts of our Navy and 
nation.”122  
Admiral Masso released guidance that expanded upon the 
CNO’s Guidance with regard to the diversity issue.  ADM 
Masso writes  
Diversity is a strategic imperative for the 
United States Navy.  We defend the greatest 
nation in the world.  It is a nation that 
welcomes, indeed encourages, the active 
participation of every citizen regardless of 
race, gender, creed or color – A democracy 
founded on the promise of opportunity for all.  
It is also a nation whose demographic makeup 
continually changes reflecting the influx of new 
immigrants and the growth of minority 
populations.  The Navy must change with it.  To 
the degree we truly represent our democracy, we 
are a stronger, more relevant armed force.  
Diversity is a leadership issue, and everyone is 
a leader.  We will Promote and engender a culture 
that embraces our diversity. Through our 
communications, education, policies, programs and 
conduct, each of us will actively foster work 
environments where people are valued, respected 
and provided the opportunity to reach their full 
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personal and professional potential.  We will 
recruit, develop, educate and retain leaders from 
and for all parts of our navy and nation.123 
F. THE FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIRMAN AND EDUCATION 
The current Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke 
delivered a speech to the Omaha Chamber of Commerce on 
February 6, 2007.  His speech focused on the economic 
changes of the world and the United States position in the 
sea of change.  Part of his speech focused on the education 
of Americans.  Specifically he said the disparity in 
education and training is “likely the single greatest source 
of the long term increase in inequality.  Polices that boost 
our national investment in education and training can help 
reduce inequality while expanding economic opportunity.”124  
This statement does not directly impact the Navy.  He also 
notes that there are disparities in the educational system 
and that they should be addressed.  The Navy has already 
answered this call by providing a VOLED program to the 
sailors who desire it.  With this disparity problem making 
front page headlines the Navy can answer with the VOLED 
program and offer new recruits an option to gain an advanced 
education.  Whether a person spends four or 30 years in 
Naval service, that person will return to society and have 
to participate in the changing global economy that the 
Federal Reserve chairman is speaking off.  VOLED can offer 
that ability to participate in that global economy whenever 
the sailor desires to leave active duty.   
                     
123 Navy Personnel Command, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Reference 
Library, Messages,NAVADMIN 025/07 DTG 021339Z FEB 07. 
124 Jennine Aversa, “Bernanke: Education Narrows Income Gap,” 
Washington Post, February 6, 2007. 
 90
Each article in this chapter refers to ethnic 
diversity, the willingness to participate in obtaining 
advanced education and the lack of access for many 
individuals.  When generational information for the 
Millennials are examined with the statistical analysis, 
which show that minorities and women are using VOLED and TA 
more often than their white male counterparts, a whole new 
realm of possibilities opens up for recruiting, retention 
and education. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF LITERATURE 
A. SUMMARY 
The information presented in this thesis can enable the 
Navy to achieve higher recruiting goals and understand why 
the analysis of retention and VOLED is difficult.  This 
chapter will discuss the results reached in the previous 
literature and derive implications for Navy policy. 
Three primary studies were reviewed to discover if 
continuing education improved retention, or if funding 
advanced education enabled service members to exit their 
service at a faster rate.  The studies reached three 
different conclusions. 
The VOLED study conducted by CNA discovered that 
retention was higher for those who used the Navy’s VOLED 
system, and the researchers also listed other important 
benefits attributed to the program.  The RAND Corporation 
study found the opposite result, that funding advanced 
education leads to decreased retention.  The Army study 
found that when soldiers used their advanced education 
programs, retention was higher, but only slightly. 
All three studies used different research design and 
methods, which in part explains the different results 
concerning the effect of VOLED on retention.  One item was 
clear throughout all the studies, though.  Women and 
minorities consistently used the advanced education programs 




itself, but when the current population demographic shifts 
that are occurring within the United States are considered, 
this fact becomes more relevant. 
The generation information provided in Chapter IV 
combined with the results obtained from the statistical 
studies provides a target market for the military.  The 
Millennial generation values education (especially women and 
minorities), but their access to that education is reduced 
because of increased tuition costs.  Currently, these young 
people are funding their education with huge college loans, 
causing them future debt problems.  The demographic groups 
in the U. S. that are seeking advanced education are 
shifting toward women and minorities.  As these groups 
achieve higher status within society old social norms will 
change paving the way for individuals with higher education 
and higher skills to be successful in society.  
The country is moving toward a highly technical 
workforce, both in the civilian and military sectors.  In 
order to participate, higher education will be required.  If 
that higher education is not obtained, the opportunity gap 
within society widens, and the potential for increased 
poverty for the country grows. 
Recently, Flag officers have called for increased 
diversity throughout the Navy.  Senior leaders are aware of 
the demographic shifts within the population and desire the 
Navy to lead the way in having their service mirror society.  
Yet, they did not offer a detailed plan on achieving this 
goal.  The VOLED program could be the detail that is needed 
to bring the Flag Officer’s vision into reality. 
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The Federal Reserve Chairman has challenged politicians 
to increase the educational opportunities for younger 
Americans entering college.  The Navy has already answered 
that call, by providing a VOLED program that does not 
require the student to be burdened with heavy debt.  This is 
in contrast to the civilian answer, which is to lower 
interest rates on student loans and make it easier for more 
people to borrow.  By borrowing though, the borrower may be 
put at future financial risk. 
When all the information of the literature is examined 
closely, the reader realizes that the Navy is poised to 
capture and retain more sailors from the demographics which 
are growing the most rapidly.   
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The research questions that were posed in this thesis 
were: What is the economic return on the Navy’s Voluntary 
Education Program (especially TA)?  What is the impact of 
Tuition Assistance on a sailor’s career? and What does a 
review of the literature indicate about the effects of the 
Voluntary Education program? 
Economic return for the Navy involves several 
components.  The literature suggests that sailors use VOLED 
in order to cross-rate, retain, and advance within their 
current rating.  The literature was not conclusive on 
whether VOLED increase retention.  Higher retention 
translates into lower replacement costs for the Navy.  
Additionally, the recruiting costs for new recruits could be 
lowered if the potential recruit seeks out the service 
instead of the service seeking out the potential recruit.  
If those who value education view the Navy as providing the 
best educational opportunities, then potential recruits will 
pursue the Navy without extra effort by the recruiters. 
Under the economic return heading, worker productivity 
for those already serving the in the Navy maybe an important 
aspect of the program.  If the daily output of a sailor 
increases from additional education, that is also a gain for 
the Navy.  The sailor who participates in VOLED could 
potentially work harder because their quality of life is 
increased by participating in VOLED, which increases 
personal satisfaction for the member.  This increase in 
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personal satisfaction could lead to higher worker 
performance, which in turn, leads to higher readiness 
throughout the fleet. 
The impact of VOLED on a sailor’s career covers a wide 
spectrum.  Sailors who are engaged in productive activities 
such as VOLED potentially will not attend Captain’s Mast at 
the same rate as sailors who are not involved in outside 
activities.  The reduction in refenals to Captain’s Mast 
lowers the potential for demotion rates.  Further, education 
that the sailors receive improves their study skills, 
allowing them to perform better on Rating exams, thereby 
increasing promotion rates.  Also, critical thinking skills 
are introduced to sailors who had never been exposed to 
them.  This could help junior sailors to make better 
leadership decisions during command operations. 
A review of the literature about the effects of the 
VOLED program indicates that while there is a debate about 
its effects on retention, (due to a difference in study 
methodologies), the VOLED program is a fringe benefit that 
is sought after by sailors.  There is no apparent decline in 
the desire to obtain additional education, and the program 
provides opportunities to sailors that they would otherwise 
not have. 
1. The Retention Issue 
In order to determine if an effect of VOLED does 
increase retention, a new study should be commissioned using 
the Army ACES study methodology as a baseline.  The 
methodology for analyzing the VOLED program must remain 
consistent.  While there may be criticism regarding the 
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simplicity of models used in regression analysis, the ACES 
study argues that their choice of method corrects for 
anticipated biases, which is the goal of any study. 
2. Manpower Possibilities 
The Navy benefits in numerous ways from service members 
utilizing VOLED and TA. The studies profiled in this thesis 
do show members advancing in their given rates, or cross-
rating to undermanned ratings.  This leads to reduced costs 
for recruiting in areas with enlisted manning shortfalls.  
Fewer demotions benefit the Navy by commanders or commanding 
officers not wasting their time dealing with discipline 
problem onboard their commands.  This waste of time is 
extended to the Chief’s mess and the Junior Officer’s 
wardroom.  All that time saved adds up to real productivity 
benefits.  
3. The Overlooked Results 
Women and minorities utilize the VOLED and TA programs 
more than their white male counterparts in the Navy.  The 
most drastic change in society is that the women and 
minorities will be the power base in the next generation.  
These groups will always be searching for ways to fund their 
education as the price of education rises and excludes them 
from participating in the civilian sector. 
4. Cost Effective 
Currently the VOLED program may not pay for itself as 
shown by the previous studies analyzed.  If VOLED is 
marketed inexpensively to the target market of women and 
minorities who desire higher education, and they enlist in 
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the Navy, then savings to the recruitment process may begin 
to appear.  Another way to have the program pay for itself 
is by increasing retention.  But to use VOLED as a retention 
tool, the program would have to change slightly. 
5. Solutions 
In order to stimulate change in the current polices, an 
alternative must be presented and discussed.  This solution 
should be debated vigorously so that VOLED and TA can reach 
the maximum number of sailors. 
Demographics in the U. S. are changing rapidly.  Many 
citizens are priced out of the educational market, yet they 
persist in obtaining advanced education at great cost to 
their personal financial well being.  If the VOLED program 
is emphasized to target recruiting markets (minorities and 
women) and the benefits to the individual, reduced cost of 
college for example, are stressed, then these target groups 
may enlist in higher numbers.  If this educational message 
could be distributed at a low cost, using the internet for 
example, and more people enlist because of it, cost savings 
begin to be realized.  These particular target markets are 
expanding so the chances of recruiting this group are also 
expanding.  The VOLED program could be marketed as a 
principle reason for enlisting, not just an added benefit. 
If more women and minorities enlist as a result of the 
low cost education campaign, then the accessions numbers 
increase, translating into recruiting goals being met. As a 
direct result of increased numbers of women and minorities 
in the Navy, the VOLED, to include TA usage, will increase 
because these groups value education.   
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The second part of the solution is to change the VOLED 
program slightly.  If the Navy increases the budget for the 
VOLED program the retention goal could be met.  If users are 
utilizing the resources as in years past, within the 
increased VOLED budget, more sailors will be apt to pursue 
their educational goals.  Given the optempo of the Global 
War on Terror, it will take longer for these users to obtain 
their educational goal and these users will remain in 
service because they value advanced education.  If a sailor 
realizes it may take six years to complete their education 
goals, reenlistment rates may increase. 
There is no guarantee how long the member will retain, 
but given that enlistment contracts are three or more years 
in length (or an option to extend for 24 months), it can be 
assumed that the sailor will stay to at least year six.  
After year six, the decision to stay or leave the Navy will 
not focus on education but on other quality of life factors, 
such as order selection, family decisions and deployment 
rotations. 
This above scenario follows the Flag Officers guidance 
for 2007, and satisfies the policy changes called for by the 
Federal Reserve Chairman of having better access to higher 
education.  The benefits of this program will exceed the 
cost over time because the emerging recruiting pool values 
education and is currently seeking ways to fulfill their 
educational needs.  This will solve the final problem of 
ensuring that the VOLED program is cost effective. 
Opponents to this idea will cite that the Montgomery 
G.I. Bill encourages sailors to exit the service in order to 
complete their degree.  One VOLED program, in contrast, 
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encourages sailors to stay in the Navy to complete a degree.  
The other benefits, such as medical benefits and 
exchange/commissary privileges, will retain the sailor, as 
will as an opportunity to execute permanent change of 
station (PCS) orders to shore duty. 
A second solution can also be presented.  As technology 
decreases the cost of different methods to deliver education 
the cost of the education also drops.  The newest generation 
adapts to technology faster and prefers technological 
solutions.  A change could be made to the VOLED funding 
where funding for teacher/student TA could be reduced by 
having the newest recruits participate more in the 
technology education program. 
6. Move Ahead Not Backward 
Today’s Navy is concerned about being cost efficient 
and cost effective.  Waste in the Navy needs to be 
eliminated and what resources the Navy is allocated should 
be spent wisely and in accordance with the vision of today’s 
leaders. 
Clearly, the Navy Flag community supports diversity in 
the Navy and is committed to educating that diverse force.  
This is the forward vision, and the orders are clear.  
Diversity and education of the force will be in the 
forefront of the leadership’s responsibility. 
To fund studies that continually examine the Navy’s ROI 
on the VOLED program is still a necessity, but the scope 
should be changed to reflect the changing demographics and 
the changing times.   
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7. Future Studies 
The next phase of research should conduct a retention 
study modeled after the ACES study.  This approach will 
ensure that the VOLED program components are analyzed 
separately to ensure that each part of the program works for 
the sailors of the current force.  If the program components 
are old and antiquated, then the programs will be abandoned 
by the sailors.  If the VOLED program can change to meet the 
current needs of service members, then benefits will be 
realized.  Finally, a cost benefit analysis for each 
component must be reviewed separately.  An in-depth cost 
analysis will help decision makers allocate funds to VOLED 
programs where the money can yield the highest returns. 
The speech given by Mr. Bernanke clearly supports the 
argument that lack of education increases inequality among 
Americans.  His comments to amend policies that will boost 
educational opportunities to close economic gaps are in line 
with what others have noticed with the next generation.  His 
call for education is clear; however, few governmental 
agencies are heeding the call for change. 
With the Navy’s leadership embracing diversity and 
education, and in light of the Federal Reserve Chairman’s 
comments about increasing educational opportunities, the 
Navy’s responsibility with respect to education should be 
clear: Recruit the demographics of the U. S. population and 
educate them so youth can benefit from closing the 
inequality gap. 
In conclusion, society is changing and the Navy is in a 
position to benefit from the changes without expending more 
resources.  The recommendations above are meant to spark 
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discussions of how to adapt to the changing demographics of 
society, to improve recruiting efforts, to reduce 
replacement costs for personnel, to close the opportunity 
gap for the next generation and to ensure that the younger 
generation does not bear the burden of heavy debt because of 
education.  The Navy should be a leader in this endeavor: 
Full Speed Ahead. 
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